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I. JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
78-2-2(3)(e)(iv)(14)(1996). 
II. STATEMENT OF ISSUES & STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A. Did the Board of Oil, Gas and Mining correctly conclude the Petitioner 
failed to demonstrate the gas well Operators1 acted wrongfully or inequitably? 
Standard of review: This Court should reverse the Board's findings of facts only if 
they are not supported by substantial evidence. Drake v. Indus. Comm 'n of Utah, 939 
P.2d 177, 182 (Utah 1997). However, the application of the law to those facts is 
appropriately reviewed under the "correctness" standard, but the reviewing court may 
give varying amounts of deference to the decision maker. Id. at. The application of the 
facts to the law for this issue was highly fact-dependent and required the Board to weigh 
and balance the acts and omissions of the parties to determine if equitable relief was 
warranted. For these reasons the Court should give the Board very broad discretion in 
reaching the conclusion that equitable relief was not warranted in this case. See Dept. of 
Human Serv. v. Irizarry, 945 P.2d 676, 678 (Utah 1997); Trolley Square Ass'n. v. Nielsen, 
886 P. 2d 6165 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), (cited in Drake v. Indus. Comm fn of Utah, 939 P.2d 
177, 182 (Utah 1997)). 
1
 The operators of the two wells in question are the Respondents River Gas 
Corporation, Texaco Exploration and Production, Inc., and Dominion Reserves-Utah, Inc. 
1 
B. Did the Board err in concluding that the Operators5 invitation to join a federal 
exploratory unit satisfied the statutory requirement of an "offer" under the Utah Oil and 
Gas Conservation Act? 
Standard of review: Findings of fact should be reversed only if they are not 
supported by substantial evidence. See Drake, at 181. However, the application of the 
law to those facts is appropriately reviewed on the correctness standard, on which the 
reviewing court may give varying amounts of deference to the decision maker. Id. at 
Trolley Square Ass'n. v. Nielsen, 886 P.2d 61,65 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). Because the facts 
in this case are unique to the customs of the oil and gas industry, and because the 
legislature granted the Board broad authority to implement the Utah Oil and Gas 
Conservation Act, the Court should give substantial deference to the Board's conclusions 
regarding the application of the law on this issue. Id.; accord Morton Int'l, Inc. v. 
A uditing Div. of State Tax Comm yn, 814 P.2d 5 81 (Utah 1991). 
C. Did the Board err in concluding that the Operators' offer to lease the 
landowners'2 mineral estate satisfied the statutory requirement of an "offer" under the 
Utah Oil and Gas Conservation Act? 
Standard of review: Findings of fact should be reversed only if they are not 
supported by substantial evidence. Drake at 181. Application of the law to those facts is 
2
 The "landowners" are the individuals from whom Petitioner derived his oil and 
gas interests in this matter, and are identified in the Factual Background section of this 
Brief. 
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appropriately reviewed under the correctness standard, but the reviewing court may 
nonetheless give varying amounts of deference to the decision maker. Id. ; Morton Int'l, 
Inc. v. Auditing Div. of State Tax Comm % 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991). Similar to above, 
the Court should give substantial deference to the Board's conclusions regarding the 
application of the law to the facts on this issue. 
D. Do the terms and conditions of the Board's forced pooling order violate the 
statutory requirement that the order be "just and reasonable?" 
Standard of review: Application of law to facts is appropriately reviewed on the 
correctness standard, but the reviewing court may give varying amounts of deference to 
the decision maker. Drake at 181. Because of the technical nature of the facts, the 
customs in the oil and gas industry, and the legislature's delegation of authority to the 
Board to implement the Utah Oil and Gas Conservation Act, the Court should give 
substantial deference to the Board's application of law to the facts on this issue. 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The specific statute at issue is the Oil & Gas Conservation Act, Utah Code Ann. § 
40-6-1 through § 40-6-18 (1998). (Attached as Addendum 1.) The administrative rule at 
issue is Utah Admin. Code § 649-2-9 (2000). (Attached as Addendum 2.) 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal of an Order of the Board of Oil, Gas and Mining in Docket No. 
3 
2000-009, Cause No. 243-5, dated October 4, 2000 (Order). The case concerns the rights 
and responsibilities of both the mineral owners and well Operators of a coalbed methane 
gas pool. The law in this matter is controlled by the Utah Oil and Gas Conservation Act, 
Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-1(1998), as interpreted previously by this Court in Cowling v. 
Board of Oil Gas & Mining, 830 P.2d 220 (Utah 1991). A copy of this case is attached 
as Addendum 4. 
The Petitioner owns the interests of landowners whose lands were being drained 
from two gas wells located near their property. Prior to the drilling of the wells the 
landowners repeatedly declined to lease their mineral rights to the well Operators or to 
join a federal exploratory unit to share well production. Although the landowners were 
on notice they were being drained, they failed to timely protect their interests under the 
rule of capture, or to timely file a Request for Agency Action with the Board to vest their 
rights to a share of production under the Utah Oil and Gas Conservation Act. 
Eventually the landowners sought relief from the Board of Oil, Gas and Mining, 
which granted their request to force the well Operators to share the production from the 
wells. However, because the Petitioner failed to demonstrate that the well Operators had 
acted wrongfiilly, the Board did not force the well owners to share any production from 
the well prior to the time the landowners initially sought relief from the Board. Petitioner 
challenges that finding. The Board's decision is included here as Addendum 3. 
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B. Course of Proceedings 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(3)(a) (1997) and Utah Code Ann. § 63-
46(b)- 16(4)(d) (1997), Petitioner has appealed the Board's Order directly to the Utah 
Supreme Court. 
V. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondents generally concur with Petitioners statement of facts, but believes the 
following eleven facts are determinative of the issues on appeal: 
The federally authorized Drunkards Wash Exploratory Unit ("DW Unit") was 
approved effective December 28, 1990, approximately five years before the first well in 
question was drilled. (Petitioner's Brief at 6; R. 225.) The DW Unit is controlled by the 
Unit Agreement and Unit Operating Agreement, and administered by the well Operators 
and the scientists and petroleum engineers at the fluid minerals branch of the United 
States Bureau of Land Management ("BLM"). (Petitioner's Brief at 6; R. 225.). 
As required under Federal Regulations governing federal exploratory unit 
formation and operations (see 43 C.F.R. § 3181.3) (1999), all of the uncommitted owners, 
including the landowners in this case, were provided opportunities to join the DW Unit 
through correspondence in 1990 and 1991. (R. 360-62.) 
It is undisputed that, in addition to being offered the opportunity to join the DW 
Unit, the landowners were offered the opportunity to lease their mineral interests to the 
well Operators (Petitioner's Brief at 8-9, 10-11; R. 352-57; 365-420; R. 573 Hrg. Tr. 
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121:7-123:17; 125:22-126:19 (August 23, 2000.)) It is undisputed that the landowners 
declined, either affirmatively or by their non-responsiveness, to join the DW Unit or to 
lease their mineral interests to the well Operators. (Petitioner's Brief pgs. 8-9; R. 573, 
Hrg.Tr. 144:6-151:10.) 
These uncommitted owners include the landowners whom Petitioner represents in 
this case: LaRue Layne, Terry T. Olsen & Juretta L. Olsen, Trustees under Trust 
Agreement dated 11/5/85 and Trustees as named in that certain Warranty Deed dated 
9/25/87 and recorded in Book 277, Page 268, Carbon County Records, Morris Orvill 
Alexander, individually and as Trustee as named in that certain Warranty Deed dated 
9/25/87 and recorded in Book 277, Page 268, Carbon County Records, Rita Beck, Teri 
Layne, and Kelly Layne-Benning (collectively "Landowners" or the "Olsen Family"), 
who own 65.736531 % of the minerals in Unit No. 1 and 16.28895 % of the minerals in 
Unit No. 2 (R. 341; 573, Hrg. Tr. 75:13), and Carbon County which originally owned and 
now again owns 1.277511 % of the minerals in Unit No. 2. (R. 573, Hrg. Tr. 10:7-10.) 
With respect to the Olsen Family, LaRue Layne, whom the well Operators had 
been informed and assured "spoke" for all members of the Olsen Family (R. 573, Hrg. Tr. 
120:17-121:6), was invited to lease or to join the DW Unit between 1991 and 1993, but 
did not respond to the offers. (R. 352-57.) After previous attempts to join their interests 
were ignored or refused, the well Operators sent certified letters dated July 20, 1995, 
inviting Mrs. Layne and the remaining Olsen Family members to either lease or commit 
6 
their interests to the DW Unit (Petitioner's Brief at 8-9) as working interest owners on the 
same terms as any other working interest owners in their respective positions. (R. 376-
420.) All knew or should have known of the well Operators' plans, as DW Unit 
Operator, to drill on the captured lands. The Board found the terms and conditions of the 
offers were reasonable and in good faith. (R 562.) The landowners failed to respond, or 
to make a counter proposal to the offers. (Petitioner's Brief at 9; R. 573, Hrg. Tr. 126:10-
12.) In 1998, the well Operators offered to purchase the interests of certain Olsen Family 
members (Petitioner's Brief at 10-11.; R. 573, Hrg. Tr. 78:17-79:9), but acceptable terms 
could not be reached except with Mr. John Joe Skinner (Petitioner's Brief at 11.) 
The locations and drilling of both wells were authorized by the Utah Division of 
Oil, Gas & Mining's approval of applications for permit to drill and the Board's Order 
entered in Cause No. 243-2 on July 13, 1999. (R. 573, Hrg. Tr. 57:2-11.) Both wells are 
located on leaseholds owned solely by the well Operators. 
At the time the wells in question, the Utah 5-94 and the Woolstenhulme 5-266, 
were drilled the lands were subject to the Board's general well siting rule (Utah Admin. 
Code R649-3-2), which rule was later suspended by virtue of the Board's Order entered 
in Cause No. 243-3. 
The well Operators presented evidence at the Board hearing that the geological 
data and offsetting well production history, as well as the options available for water 
disposal existing at the time the Utah 5-94 and Woolstenhulme 5-266 wells were drilled, 
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supported the existence of substantial risks assumed by the Operators in proceeding with 
the drilling of the wells. (R. 573, Hrg. Tr. 200:10-203:9.) 
The leases that Petitioner acquired from the Olsen Family included terms no more 
favorable than the terms in the leases the well Operators had previously offered to them, 
except for a clause which prohibits Petitioner's joinder of the leases to the DW Unit 
without the lessors' express consent. (R. 573, Hrg. Tr. 95:18, 19.) 
The Petitioner's lands were not subject to any spacing order until entry of the 
Board's Order in Cause No. 243-3 effective January 26, 2000. Utah Admin. Code R649-
3-2(1999). 
In establishing the drilling and spacing units for the production of gas, including 
coalbed methane, the Board expressly rejected Petitioner's request that the Order be 
retroactively effective to the dates of first production of the Utah 5-94 and 
Woolstenhulme 5-266 wells as to each respective unit. (R. 564.) 
VI. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
A. The Court Should Review The Issues On Appeal With Substantial Deference To 
The Board's Findings and Conclusions 
As described above, the first issue on appeal was a highly fact dependent weighing 
and balancing of the acts and omissions of the various parties to determine whether 
equitable relief was warranted. For these reasons the Court should give great deference to 
the Board's findings of fact and conclusions of law on this issue. See Trolley Square at 
65. The second and third issues should be reviewed under the correctness standard but 
8 
with substantial deference to the Board's findings and conclusions. The three issues on 
appeal are described below. 
B. Petitioner Failed To Demonstrate The Well Operators Acted Wrongfully And 
Therefore. He Was Not Entitled To Equitable Relief 
Petitioner sought a pooling order from the Board to be applied retroactively to the 
date the wells in question first produced coalbed methane gas. The Board granted the 
pooling order but applied it retroactive only to the date of the prior spacing order, not to 
the date of first production. 
Both the Board and the parties agree that a forced pooling order is to be applied 
retroactively to a date no earlier than the date of entry of the prior "spacing order" unless 
a party acted wrongfully or fraudulently,3 in which case the Board has the equitable 
authority to make the pooling order retroactive to some time prior to the spacing order. In 
this case the "wrongful" conduct test is particularly stringent because no spacing order 
had yet been entered, and therefore, the rights of the parties were controlled solely by the 
law of capture, i.e., the parties have no obligation to protect each others interests. 
Petitioner failed to demonstrate any conduct which was wrongful or otherwise warranted 
equitable relief. In fact, the Petitioner's landowners failed to timely protect their interest 
in production prior to entry of a spacing order, which is a waiver of their interests until 
the spacing order is entered. 
3
 Adkins v. Board of Oil Gas and Mining, 926 P.2d 880, 884 (1996). 
See also Cowling v. Bd of Oil Gas & Mining, 830 P.2d 220, 228 (Utah 1991). 
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C. The Offers Made by the Well Operators Satisfied The Statutory Requirements of 
An "Offer9 And, As a Result, The Landowners' Refusal to Accept Those Offers 
Made Them "Nonconsenting Owners'' 
In response to the Petitioner's request for forced pooling, the well Operators 
sought a nonconsent penalty against Petitioner's landowners to compensate the Operators 
for the risks they incurred in drilling the two wells in question. The Board found that the 
Operators carried their burden of proof by demonstrating they complied with the statutory 
requirement that they make written offers to the landowners prior to drilling the wells. 
Petitioner argued the offers did not meet the statutory requirements because they 
were not on a per well basis. Based upon the language of both the statute and the 
applicable regulations, and based upon the holding of the Cowling case, the Board 
rejected Petitioner's narrow interpretation of the statute and found that the Operators' 
offers to lease and to join a federal exploratory unit were acceptable types of offers under 
the statute. 
Because the landowners declined to accept the offers made to them the Board 
deemed them "nonconsenting owners" and, as required by law, properly imposed a 
nonconsent penalty on the Petitioner's landowners. 
D. The Terms of the Pooling Order Are Just And Reasonable 
Finally, Petitioner argues the terms and conditions of the Board's forced pooling 
order are unjust and unreasonable in violation of the terms of the forced pooling statute. 
10 
Many of the terms and conditions of a forced pooling order are mandated by 
statute,4 and to the extent Petitioner is requesting that the Board modify those mandatory 
terms, it does not have the authority to do so. To the extent Petitioner is arguing that the 
Board imposed other, discretionary terms, which it believes are unjust or unreasonable, 
the Board disagrees. Each of Petitioner's concerns arise directly from the other issues 
Petitioner has raised in this appeal. In summary, Petitioner's third issue on appeal is a 
reformulation of its first two arguments, and whether the terms and conditions are 
"unjust" and "unreasonable" would depend upon whether or not this Court upholds the 
Board's findings of fact and conclusions of law in this matter. 
VII. ARGUMENT 
A. Substantial Evidence is the Appropriate Standard for Reviewing The First Issue; 
The "Correctness" Standard Of Review, With Substantial Deference To The 
Board's Conclusions. Is Appropriate for the Second and Third Issues On Appeal 
The Board's findings of fact should be reversed only if they are not supported by 
substantial evidence. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4) (1997). See also Drake at 181). 
The Board's application of the facts to the law, should be reviewed under the 
"correctness" standard,.5 but with some deference to the agency. The amount of 
4
 Seey e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-6.5(4)(a)-(e) (1998). 
5
 Some of the issues on appeal can be viewed as either mixed findings of fact and 
law or, perhaps more properly, as the Board's exercise of both its explicit and implicit 
powers to interpret the operative provisions of the statutory law it is empowered to 
administer. 
11 
deference a court gives will vary, and falls " . . . anywhere between a review for 
'correctness' and a broad 'abuse of discretion' standard." Drake, 939 P.2d at 181. For 
example, highly fact-dependent issues and issues of equity are granted very broad 
discretion.6 Fact-specific cases for which the courts find it difficult to formulate a "fact-
specific rule of law" are given a moderate amount of discretion. Id. at 182. Finally, those 
areas of the law where a "serviceable" legal standard has arisen will be provided the least 
amount of deference. Id. at 182. 
As to the first issue on appeal, Petitioner expressly agreed the Cowling case 
describes the appropriate legal test in this matter (R. 573, Hrg. Tr. 234.) He only argued 
that, under the facts of this case, an equitable remedy should be awarded. This is clearly 
fact-finding followed by application of facts in equity. The Court should review the 
Board's findings of facts under the very deferential substantial evidence standard. The 
Court should review the application of those facts to the law under the correctness 
standard, but give great deference to the Board's discretion to grant equitable relief. 
Irizzary at 678; Trolley Square, 886 P.2d at 65. The Board, which by law is composed of 
members knowledgeable in mining and oil and gas matters,7 has been delegated authority 
6Dept. of Human Serv. v. Irizarry, 945 P.2d 676, 678 (Utah 1997) (Fact intensive 
circumstances weigh heavily against the Court substituting its judgment for that of the 
fact finder); Trolley Square Associates v. Nielson, 886 P.2d 61, 65 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), 
(cited by Drake at 182). 
7
 See Utah Code Ann. 40-6-4(2)(a) - (e) (1998). 
12 
from the Legislature to engage in fact-finding of a very technical nature for purposes of 
implementing the Oil and Gas Conservation Act. The Board also relies upon the 
guidance of the geologists and petroleum engineers at the Division of Oil, Gas and 
Mining, to help sort through the factual issues.(R 573, Hrg. Tr. 252:15 - 255; 10.) For 
these reasons the Court should reverse to the Board's findings of fact only if they are not 
supported by substantial evidence, and it should give deference to the Board's application 
of those facts to the law. 
The second major issue on appeal involves the types, terms, and conditions of 
offers made by the well Operators to the landowners. This is pure fact finding and again, 
the Court should reverse the Board's findings of fact only if not supported by substantial 
evidence. However, the Board applied the relevant facts to the type of statutory "offer" 
required to be made under the Act,8 thus this is a mixed question of fact and law. As 
described above, because of the technical nature of the fact finding and the nature of the 
authority delegated to it by the Legislature, the Board believes the Court should review 
with substantial deference to the Board's discretion. 
The third issue on appeal is whether the terms and conditions of the forced pooling 
order are "just and reasonable" as required by the Act. There is no dispute that the legal 
8
 The Board believes there are numerous types of "offers" which may be made 
under Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-2(11), and that the Legislature delegated to the Board the 
authority to determine which "offers" satisfy the Legislature's intent. Petitioner appears 
to argue the Legislature narrowly limited the types of offers which can be made. 
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test is "just and reasonable." The only issue is whether the terms and conditions of the 
order satisfy that legal test, i.e., again a question of mixed fact and law. For the reasons 
described above the Board believes the Court should review the Board's conclusions for 
correctness by reviewing the Board's exercise of discretion for reasonableness. 
Justice Durham's analysis in Semeco Indus., Inc. v. Auditing Div. of State Tax 
Comm 'n, 849 P.2d 1167 (Utah 1993), and this Court's opinions in Bennion v. ANR Prod. 
Co., 819 P.2d 343 (Utah 1991), and Morton InV7, Inc., 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991), all 
support deference to the Board's findings and conclusions in this case regarding issues 
two and three. As Justice Durham explains Morton in her Semeco dissent: 
In the absence of discernible legislative intent concerning this specific 
question and issue, a choice among permissible interpretations of the statute 
is largely a policy determination. The agency that has been granted 
authority to administer the statute is the appropriate body to make such a 
determination. Indeed, both the legislative history to Section 63-46b-16, 
and our prior cases suggest that an appellate court should not substitute its 
judgment for the agency's judgment concerning the wisdom of the agency's 
policy. When there is no discernible legislative intent concerning the 
specific issue the legislature has, in effect, left the issue unresolved. In such 
a case it is appropriate to conclude that the legislature has delegated 
authority to decide the issue. 
Semeco, 849 P.2d at 1173 (Durham, J., dissenting). Justice Durham cautions that both 
courts and attorneys distinguish between whether an agency action is an interpretation or 
application of law reviewed under sub-section (4)(d), or "merely an exercise of implicitly 
delegated discretion to interpret or apply the law, reviewed under Utah Code Ann. §63-
46b-16(4)(h)(i)." M a t 1174. 
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B. Petitioner Failed To Carry The Heavy Burden of Demonstrating That, Under the • 
Law of Capture. The Well Operators Had Acted Wrongfully Or Inequitably 
The parties agree the first issue on appeal is controlled by this Court's ruling in 
Cowling. The Cowling opinion directly addressed where the law of capture ends and the 
Utah Oil and Gas Conservation Act begins. Cowling v. Bd. of Oil Gas & Mining, 830 
P.2d 220, 224 (Utah 1991). Because the rights and obligations of landowners and well 
operators under the law of capture differs significantly from their rights under the 
Conservation Act, it is necessary that the boundary be clear.9 Pursuant to Cowling that 
boundary is the date a "spacing order" is entered. Under Cowling, from the time a well 
begins production until the time a spacing order is entered there is no statutory or 
regulatory mechanism controlling person's rights, and the landowners and well operators 
are subject solely to the law of capture. Id. 
The first issue on appeal is the appropriate retroactive date for the application of a 
forced pooling order. Forced pooling orders always occur after entry of a spacing order 
and are a creature of the Conservation Act. See Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-6.5 (1998); 
Cowling at 226. In Cowling, the Utah Supreme Court held that the Utah Board of Oil, 
Gas and Mining should not make a pooling order effective prior to entry of a spacing 
order. Id. at 229. However, the Cowling Court also indicated that the law of capture was 
9
 As a matter of law, the Utah Oil and Gas Conservation Act does not abrogate the 
law of capture in Utah until such time as the Board enters a spacing order. Cowling, 830 
P.2d at 224-226. 
15 
not without limits. If a well operator engages in "wrongful" or "inequitable" conduct, the 
Court may remedy that wrong by equitably applying the pooling order retroactive to some 
time prior to the date of the spacing order. Id. at 228-229.10 However, the remedy does 
not arise under the Conservation Act. It is an equitable remedy for a wrong which, in the 
case of Cowling, allegedly occurred during the period the law of capture applied. The 
parties in this case agree that the "wrongful" conduct test is the legal test in this matter, 
and the first question on appeal is whether the well Operator acted wrongfully under the 
facts of this case. 
The Utah Supreme Court has addressed what constitutes "wrongful" conduct in 
two oil and gas cases. In Cowling, which involved the drilling of a well prior to entry of a 
spacing order, the Court stated the conduct must be "wrongful" or "inequitable" to 
override the law of capture. Id. at 228-29. The Cowling Court rejected the argument that 
a well operator's delay in seeking a spacing order rose to the level of wrongful or 
inequitable conduct, and held that the failure of a landowner to protect their interests was 
a waiver of those interests. Id. at 229. 
In the second case, Adkins v Board of Oil Gas and Mining, 926 P.2d 880 (1996), 
the land surrounding the well had been spaced but the drilling unit in question allegedly 
failed to include all areas of land being drained by that unit's well. In Adkins, the 
10
 Prior to entry of a spacing order correlative rights are merely an "opportunity" to 
produce a just and equitable share without waste. Cowling at 225. Those "rights" only 
vest into a quantifiable right upon entry of a spacing order. Id. 
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Conservation Act had been triggered by entry of a spacing order, which of course, 
"modifies" the law of capture and quantifies ones "correlative rights." Cowling, 830 P.2d 
at 224-26. The plaintiff in Adkins sought relief many years after his property had been 
drained, and argued that the failure of the well operator to seek to modify the shape of the 
drilling unit to include his property located on an adjacent drilling block, constituted 
wrongful conduct. The Adkins Court disagreed, citing Cowling for the position that the 
alleged misconduct must be egregious, rising to a level of "fraud or inequitable conduct." 
Adkins, 926 P.2d at 884. 
This Court makes clear in Adkins that the failure of the landowners to protect their 
interests, even after the Conservation Act is triggered, is a waiver of those rights. Id. at 
884. Put another way, at no time does the well operator have an affirmative legal 
obligation to seek a spacing order, or to seek to modify an existing spacing order - the 
burden is on the landowners to protect their interests. As described in Cowling, prior to 
entry of a spacing order the "inequitable" or "fraudulent" test is especially stringent 
because, prior to entry of a spacing order there are no quantified correlative rights, and 
the well operator has no duty to the adjoining landowners under the law of capture. 
Cowling, 830 P.2d at 224. Since they have no duty to each other, they have no legal duty 
to seek a spacing order. Under the law of capture the landowners and well operators have 
no legal duty to protect each others' interests except as may arise as between any two 
individuals, i.e., a general duty not to commit fraud. A landowner who fails to seek relief 
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under the law of capture waives his rights until entry of a spacing order. Adkins, 926 P.2d 
at 883-84; Cowling, 830 P.2d at 228. 
In the case at bar it is undisputed that the landowners' property had not been 
spaced at the time the wells were drilled. (Petitioner's Brief at 13-14; 21; 24; 35.) As a 
result, the law of capture controlled the rights and obligations of the parties. The well 
owner was under no duty to seek a spacing order; therefore, in the absence of wrongful 
conduct, the Operators' failure to do so does not constitute "wrongful" or "fraudulent" 
conduct. Thus, under Cowling, the pooling order should apply retroactively only to the 
date of the spacing order. {See R. 573, Hrg. Tr. 234.) For this reason the Board's Order 
should be upheld. 
C. The Board Correctly Concluded That The Offers Made To The Landowners 
Satisfied The Statutory Requirements For A Written "Offer." And The 
Landowners Failure to Accept The Offers Resulted In them Becoming 
"Nonconsenting Owners" 
The second issue on appeal is the Board's conclusion that the landowners were 
made written offers to participate in the drilling of the wells, that they did not accept 
those offers, and as a result, the landowners satisfied the statutory definition of 
"nonconsenting owners." u Accordingly, and at the Operators' request, the Board 
imposed on the landowners a statutorily mandated "nonconsent penalty" to compensate 
the Operators for the risks they took in drilling the wells. 
Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-2(11) (1998). 
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Petitioner makes two arguments to support his appeal on this issue. His first 
argument is that prior to entry of a spacing order no offer of any kind can satisfy the 
statutory requirements for an "offer," and therefore, it is impossible for the landowners to 
be "nonconsenting owners." See e.g., Petitioner's Brief 17, 34, 35.12 Petitioner did not 
directly raise this issue before the Board, and in his "Statement of Issues & Standard of 
Review" section of his Brief he does not cite to the administrative record showing when 
and where this legal issue was made below or preserved for appeal. Failure to raise an 
issue during the administrative proceeding is a waiver of that argument. See Brown & 
Root Indus. Serv. v Indus. Comm 'n, 947 P.2d 671, 677 (Utah 1977). Petitioner should not 
be allowed to argue on appeal that the Board erred "as a matter of law" when he failed to 
raise this legal issue for the Board's consideration. 
The second issue Petitioner raises on appeal, one raised before the Board, is 
whether the offers made by the Operators were of a type which satisfied the statutory 
requirements. Petitioner argued below that the only type of offer which is acceptable 
under the Act is an offer made on a "proportionate" per well (single well) basis. 
(Petitioner's Brief at 36-40.) The Board rejected such a narrow interpretation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 40-6-2(11) and found that broader types of offers, including offers to lease 
12
 Petitioner's first argument appears to stem from a realization that the types of 
offers which he argued below should have been made by the Operators to the landowners 
could not possibly be made without prior entry of a spacing order. On appeal he has re-
focused his argument from one based upon the facts surrounding the actual offers made, 
to a legal question of whether any offer could have satisfied the statute. 
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and offers for proportionate cost sharing for more than one well, satisfied both the 
statutory and regulatory requirements of the Act. 
Without waiver of its objection to the Petitioner's failure to raise the first issue 
before the Board, the Board responds to the two arguments as follows: 
1. Background and Purposes of the Nonconsent Penalty 
The Act provides that the Board shall impose on "nonconsenting owners" a 
nonconsent penalty between 150% and 300% of the drilling costs described at Utah Code 
Ann. § 40-6-6.5(4)(d)(i)(D) (1998). The purpose of the penalty is not to penalize, but to 
compensate those persons who participate in the risk of drilling the well in the event the 
well is ultimately successful and nonparticipating landowners attempt to force pool their 
way into co-owning the successful well. 
The Supreme Court views the sliding scale nonconsent penalty as compensation 
for those who assumed the financial risk of drilling the well. The penalty is 
incentive for voluntary participation, rather than punitive damages, for 
recalcitrance - hence a risk-compensation penalty. Also, it ensures that 
nonconsenting owners do not benefit from a successful well for which they 
assumed no risk. 
Phillip Wm. Lear, Utah Oil and Gas Conservation Law and Practice, Utah L. Rev. 89, 
127 (1998). The Act requires the Board to impose a penalty within a statutory range of 
150% to 300%, so the penalty amount is commensurate with the risk taken by those who 
paid for the well. However, as correctly pointed out by the Petitioner, before imposing a 
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penalty for failing to participate in, and taking the risk of, drilling the well, the Act 
requires that the landowner be provided an opportunity to participate in the drilling risk. 
Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-6.5 (1998). 
2. Statutory and Regulatory Definitions Indicate Various Types of Offers are 
Acceptable if Made in Good Faith 
Both the Act and the applicable regulation address the definition of a "non-
consenting owner." A "nonconsenting owner" is defined in the Act as " an owner who 
after written notice does not consent in advance to the drilling and operation of the well or 
agree to bear his proportionate share of the costs." Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-2(11) (1998). 
The Utah oil and gas regulation which further refines what constitutes a nonconsenting 
owner states in relevant part: 
R649 -2-9 Refusal to Agree. 
1. An owner shall be deemed to have refused to agree to bear his 
proportionate share of the costs of the drilling and operation of a well under 
section 40-6-6(6) if: 
1.1. The operator of the proposed well has, in good faith, attempted to reach 
agreement with such owner for the leasing of the owner's mineral interest or for 
that owner's voluntary participation in the drilling of the well. 
1.2 The owner and the operator have been unable to agree upon terms for 
the leasing of the owner's interest or for the owner's participation in the drilling of 
the well. 
2. If the operator of the proposed well shall fail to attempt, in good faith, to 
reach agreement with the owner for the leasing of that owner's mineral interests or 
for voluntary participation by that owner in the well prior to the filing of a Request 
for Agency Action for involuntary pooling of the interests in the drilling unit under 
Section 40-6-6(6) then, upon written request and after notice and hearing, the 
hearing on the Request for Agency Action for involuntary pooling may, at the 
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discretion of the board or its designated hearing examiner, be delayed for a 
period not to exceed 30 days, to allow for negotiations between the operator 
and the owner. 
Utah Admin. Code R649-2-9 (2000)(emphasis added). 
This regulatory definition of a "nonconsenting owner" expressly allows the 
operator to make at least two different types of offers: 1) an offer to agree to the drilling 
or operation of a well, or 2) or an offer to "agree to bear his proportionate share of costs." 
Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-2(11) (1998). The first type of offer is very broad and is only 
limited by the requirement that the offer involve the landowner agreeing to the drilling or 
operation of one or more wells. It does not mean the landowner must be offered a 
proportionate "working interest" in a single well.13 The second type of offer is also 
broad, and only requires some type of proportionate cost sharing by the owner.14 
As noted above, regulation R649-2-9 expressly states that "leases" of mineral 
interests are an acceptable type of offer under the statute. Therefore, contrary to the 
13
 Examples of this type of offer would include offers to lease the landowner's 
mineral interests in exchange for agreeing to the drilling of a well which will drain their 
property. Another example would be an offer to join a federal exploratory unit in 
exchange for the landowners agreeing to the drilling of a well which will drain their 
property. 
14
 An example of this type would include an offer to join a federal exploratory unit, 
where costs are shared between more than one well. A lease however, would not satisfy 
this second type of offer because a lease, by itself, usually does not involve cost sharing. 
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Petitioner's interpretation, acceptable types of offers are not restricted to those made on a 
proportionate cost sharing or on a per well basis; other types of offers satisfy the 
regulatory requirements. 
Just as important, R649-2-9 focuses on whether the offers are made in good faith, 
i.e., the gist of the statute and regulation is not to narrowly restrict the types of offers 
available, but to make sure the offer is made in good faith. Both the statute and the 
regulation15 encourage the parties to voluntarily reach agreement before seeking 
involuntary pooling. This supports the Board's conclusion that various types of offers 
may be made other than the limited, single type of offer argued for by the Petitioner.16 
For the above reasons, the Board believes that reasonable and good faith offers of 
a type customarily made in the oil and gas industry are expressly and implicitly 
authorized by both the statute and the regulations. Those types of acceptable offers 
include offers to lease and offers to join federal exploratory units. 
3. The Landowners Received Offers to Lease and Offers to Join the Federal 
Exploratory Unit 
The landowners in this case were members of a family headed by Ms. LaRue 
Layne. It is undisputed that at least two types of written offers were extended to Ms. 
Layne prior to the drilling of each well. (Petitioner's Brief at 8; R. 352-57; 360-62; 365-
15
 Utah Admin. Code R649-2-9(2). 
16
 More types of offers, not less, would be to the benefit of the landowners, and 
voluntarily allow them to participate in the pool in various ways. 
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420; R. 573, Hrg. Tr. 121:7-123:17; 125:22-126:19.) Between 1991 and 1993, two years 
before drilling the first well, the Operators invited Ms. Layne and the family members to 
either join the Federal Drunkards Wash Exploratory Unit or to lease their mineral 
interests.17 (R. 360-62; R. 352-57; 365-420; R. 573, Hrg. Tr. 121:7-123:17; 125:22-
126:19; 127:6-133:13; 152:8-163:20.) The Board found the terms of the offers 
reasonable and made in good faith. (R. 559; See also R. 573, Hrg. Tr. 129:8-24; 131:20-
132:12; 133:14-134:21; 140:4-20.) Ms. Layne did not accept the offers. (See e.g. R.573, 
Hrg. Tr. 133:-10-13; 135:5-8.) 
Prior to the second well being drilled the Operators offered to lease Ms. Layne's 
and the other family members' mineral interests. The Board found the terms of the lease 
offer reasonable and in good faith. Ms. Layne and all but one of her family members, 
failed to accept the offer to lease. One landowner, Mr. Skinner, accepted the offer to 
lease. (Petitioner's Brief at 11.) Some family members followed up with questions but 
did not accept the offer. (R. 573, Hrg. Tr. 149:19-150:17.) Ms. Layne also represented to 
the Operators that she represented the interests of the other family members. (R. 573, 
Hrg.Tr. 135:9-19.) 
17
 An offer to join the field wide federal unit would mean that the participants 
would have an opportunity to participate in, and be responsible for the costs of, some or 
all wells in the unit, regardless of whether or not they are draining their property. Put 
another way, instead of a greater proportionate interest in the single well draining their 
property, they would have an opportunity to participate in a lesser proportionate interest 
in the larger number of wells in the field. 
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The Petitioner has failed to present a legal argument why an offer to join a federal 
unit on reasonable terms does not satisfy the terms of the statute and regulations. 
Similarly, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate how the offers to lease do not satisfy the 
regulatory requirement that an offer to lease is an acceptable form of offer. This is 
especially true if the landowners already rejected the offer to join the federal unit. An 
offer to lease provided the landowners a second, very common, alternative to joining the 
federal unit, and was protective of their rights. 
4. Summary of Second Issue on Appeal 
In summary, for the first time Petitioner argues that ;;a mineral owner cannot be 
rendered a 'nonconsenting owner' under the Conservation Act until after the landowner's 
correlative rights in a pool have been defined by a spacing order." (Petitioner's Brief at 
17, 34.) Put another way, Petitioner argues it is impossible to make any offer which 
satisfies the statutory requirements of the Act prior to entry of a spacing order. Therefore, 
he argues, it was impossible for his landowners to be subject to a nonconsent penalty in 
any amount. (Petitioner's Brief at 34, 35.) 
Petitioner's narrow interpretation of the definition of a nonconsenting owner, Utah 
Code Ann. § 40-6-2(11) is contrary to both the text of the definition, which allows offers 
on a cost sharing basis, and to the applicable regulations, which expressly authorize offers 
such as mineral leases. The Board believes that the legislative intent behind the definition 
of a "nonconsenting owner" was not to limit the types of offers which can be made, as 
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long as they are reasonable, bona fide, good faith offers which are customary in the 
industry. The broad language of the definition supports a broad interpretation of what 
constitutes an offer. In addition, this Court made clear in Cowling that the rule of capture 
is alive in Utah, and that landowners have an obligation to protect themselves from being 
drained. Cowling, 839 P.2d at 228. ("An owner's failure to take action to establish and 
protect his or her interest in production prior to the entry of a spacing order constitutes a 
waiver of that interest until a drilling unit is established.") Under the Petitioner's theory, 
these two concepts would be nullified if it is impossible for a well Operator to make an 
offer prior to entry of a spacing order because sole responsibility for seeking a spacing 
order would be shifted to the well Operators, or they forfeit any right to a nonconsent 
penalty. This, of course, relieves the landowners of any responsibility to protect their 
own rights. Either the well Operator seeks the spacing order or the landowner can sit 
back and see if the well is successful before forcing their way into the well risk-free and 
with no penalty. This is contrary to the rule of capture and much of the reasoning of 
Cowling. 
The Board is unaware of any legislative history of the Act to support Petitioner's 
interpretation. Nowhere in the definition of "nonconsenting owners" does it indicate that 
a spacing order needs to be entered before an offer could be made. If the Legislature 
intended such a critical requirement, it is unlikely it would have omitted it from the 
definition. To imply a spacing order requirement would be inconsistent with the long and 
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complex forced pooling and nonconsent penalty provisions of the Act, which could be 
easily avoided if a spacing order is required by law before any offer can be made.18 The 
simplest explanation is usually the correct one. If the Legislature intended a spacing 
order was necessary before any offer could be made, it would have expressly included 
such a critical requirement in the statute, and not have implied it through a relatively 
convoluted interpretation of the definition of "nonconsenting owner." The offers to lease 
and the offers to join the federal exploratory unit satisfied the requirements of written 
offers under the Act and regulations. The failure of the landowners to accept these offers 
resulted in them being "nonconsenting owners" under the Act. 
D. The Terms Of The Pooling Order Are Just and Reasonable 
In the third and final section of his Brief the Petitioner argues that: the terms of the 
pooling agreement are not just and reasonable; that it "penalizes unsophisticated, absentee 
landowners"; that it provides the Operators with more than their just and equitable share; 
that it unjustly imposes a 225% nonconsent penalty; and that it allegedly "penalizes" 
drained parties for "exercising their rights." Finally, he asserts the Board "abrogated its 
responsibilities" under the Act to protect correlative rights by "deferring to the rule of 
capture long after the initial exploratory phase of production has ended." (Petitioner's 
Brief at 42-44.) The Board disagrees. 
18
 For example, in North Dakota the Commission in charge of spacing is required 
by law to space a well within thirty days of drilling. 
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1. Many Terms Of The Board's Forced Pooling Order Are Mandated By 
Statute And Cannot Be Modified By The Board 
Forced pooling statutes have been upheld almost without exception for most of the 
last one-hundred years. See, Phillip Wm. Lear, Utah Oil and Gas Conservation Law and 
Practice, Utah L. Rev. 89, 122 (1998). Like other states' conservation statutes, Utah's 
statute mandates that the terms of a forced pooling order be "just and reasonable." Utah 
Code Ann. § 40-6-6.5(2Xb) (1998). Many of the terms of a Utah forced pooling order 
are mandated by statute, including the minimum amount of a nonconsent penalty, and the 
terms and conditions for sharing costs and production. See Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-
6.5(4)-(9) (1998). The Board is not free to change the statutorily mandated provisions, 
and once it found the landowners were "nonconsenting owners," it was required by law to 
impose at least a 150% nonconsent penalty. See Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-6.5 (1998) ("an 
amount to be determined by the Board but not less than 150%...."). To the extent the 
Petitioner objects to terms required by statute, the Board is without the authority to 
change those terms. 
2. Petitioner's Assertions Were Either Not Raised Below Or Are Merely A 
Reassertion Of His Prior Arguments 
Petitioner asserts that the Act may "penalize unsophisticated, absentee 
landowners." (Petitioner's Brief at 41.) Petitioner did not raise below his assertion that 
the landowners were '"absentee," and therefore, the Board did not have an opportunity to 
determine what constitutes "absentee," whether the landowners were in fact absentee, and 
28 
if so, how much weight to give that consideration.19 Petitioner failed to bring that issue to 
the Board's attention. See Brown & Root Indus. Serv., 947 P.2d 671 (Utah 1977). 
Because Petitioner did not raise that issue before the Board, it is waived. 
As described above, a correlative right is merely an "opportunity" to produce one's 
just and equitable share without waste. Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-2(2) (1998). One's 
failure to timely protect one's right is a waiver of those rights. Cowling, 830 P.2d at 228. 
In this case Petitioner's landowners had numerous options and opportunities to protect 
their interests, but failed to do so. 
The Board understands the Petitioner's concerns regarding "unsophisticated" 
landowners. However, the Petitioner has cited no authority to the Board or to the Court 
that the Board had authority under the Act to apply the laws and regulations of the state of 
Utah based upon the level of sophistication or financial resources of the parties before it. 
The Board believes it is required by law20 to interpret and enforce the legal provisions of 
the Act, and the associated regulations, in a consistent and uniform manner, regardless of 
whether the parties are large oil and gas companies or individual landowners. 
19
 Petitioner's citation in his Brief (Petitioner's Brief at 1 citing R. 408) does not 
reference ever having argued the alleged "absentee" nature of his landowners in either his 
briefs, exhibits, or testimony before the Board. Instead it cites to an exhibit attached to a 
copy of the 1995 lease offer made by the well Operators to the landowners. If Petitioner 
thought the asserted absentee nature of the landowners was relevant he should have 
brought it to the Board's attention and argued it as a factor for the Board's consideration. 
He did not. 
20
 Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-5 (1998). 
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In his Brief Petitioner also argues the penalty is unjust and unfair. It is unclear 
whether Petitioner is arguing that the imposition of any nonconsent penalty is unjust and 
unfair, or whether the amount of the penalty, 225%, is unjust and unfair, or both. The 
Board's factual and legal reasons for imposing a nonconsent penalty are described above 
in section II in this Brief. Once the Board found the landowners were "nonconsenting 
owners" it was required to impose a penalty of "not less than 150%." Utah Code Ann. § 
40-6-6.5(4)(d)(i)(D) (1998). For this reason the issue of whether any penalty is unjust or 
unfair should be decided under the analysis of whether the landowners were 
;;nonconsenting." The additional 75% of the penalty (150% plus 75% = 225%) was 
imposed to compensate the Operator for the exploratory risks inherent in coalbed methane 
exploration, and the facts surrounding the two wells in this case. ( R. 573, Hrg. Tr. 255:4-
5.) In addition, the Board considered the amount of a nonconsent penalty it imposed in a 
prior but unrelated matter similar to this case. (R. 573, Hrg. Tr. 255:1-3.) 
Petitioner also asserts his landowners were penalized for exercising their rights 
under the statute. (Petitioner's Brief at 43.) To the extent Petitioner's landowners have 
been "penalized", it is because they failed to timely seek a spacing order from the Board, 
or otherwise seek to protect their rights after they were on notice there may be oil and gas 
under their property, and again after wells were drilled nearby. 
Petitioner argues that the '"Pooling Order provides absolutely no incentive for an 
Operator to space surrounding uncommitted lands." (Petitioner's Brief at 43.) The Board 
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agrees. "Voluntary pooling agreements and forced pooling orders are the mechanisms 
used to enforce correlative rights." Cowling, 830 P.2d at 226; See also Phillip Wm. Lear, 
Utah Oil and Gas Conservation Law and Practice, Utah L. Rev. 89, 118-121 (1998). 
Their purpose is not to encourage petitions for spacing orders. The Board is unaware of 
any legal authority which stands for the position that the purpose of a forced pooling 
order under the Act is to provide an incentive for an operator to space lands. Petitioner 
does not cite any authority for this in its brief. Forced pooling orders are necessary only 
when parties cannot voluntarily agree on written pooling terms and conditions. Utah 
Code Ann. § 40-6-6.5(2) (1998). 
Finally, the Petitioner argues that the Board has "abrogated" its responsibilities by 
deferring to the rule of capture "long after the initial exploratory phase of production has 
ended." (Petitioner's Brief at 44.) Because Petitioner cites no specific facts or legal 
authority in this section of his Brief, it is unclear exactly what issue is being argued. See 
Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). However, to the extent Petitioner is making a legal argument 
that the "rule of capture" applies in Utah only during the "exploratory phase," the Board 
does not understand how that relates to the "terms and conditions of the pooling order" 
allegedly being unjust. In Cowling the Court expressly and unequivocally held that the 
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rule of capture is alive in Utah, and that until correlative rights vest, landowners must 
protect their own interests or waive them.21 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Board should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this \ day of April, 2001. 
STATE OF UTAH 
BOARD OF OIL, GAS & MINING 
MARK L, SH^RTLEFF n 
Utah Attorney General | 
(/ LM 
THOMAS A MITCHELL (#3737) 
KURT SEEL (#8374) 
Assistant Attorneys General 
160 East 300 South, 5th Floor 
Box 140857 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0857 
Telephone: (801) 366-0508 
21
 To the extent the Petitioner is attempting to argue, as it did in its Docketing 
Statement, that the Act or the pooling order is unconstitutional, the petitioner failed to 
raise before the Board any challenge to the constitutionality of the Act. Brown & Root 
Indus. Serv. v. Indus. Comm'n, 947 P.2d 671 (Utah 1977) 
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ADDENDUM 
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40-6-1. Declaration of public interest. 
It is declared to be in the public interest to foster, encourage, and promote the development, 
production, and utilization of natural resources of oil and gas in the state of Utah in such a manner 
as will prevent waste; to authorize and to provide for the operation and development of oil and 
gas properties in such a manner that a greater ultimate recovery of oil and gas may be obtained 
and that the correlative rights of all owners may be folly protected; to provide exclusive state 
authority over oil and gas exploration and development as regulated under the provisions of this 
chapter; to encourage, authorize, and provide for voluntary agreements for cycling, recycling, 
pressure maintenance, and secondary recovery operations in order that the greatest possible 
economic recovery of oil and gas may be obtained within the state to the end that the land 
owners, the royalty owners, the producers, and the general public may realize and enjoy the 
greatest possible good from these vital natural resources. 
40-6-2. Definitions. 
For the purpose of this chapter: 
(1) "Board" means the Board of Oil, Gas and Mining. 
(2) "Correlative rights" means the opportunity of each owner in a pool to produce his just and 
equitable share of the oil and gas in the pool without waste. 
(3) "Condensate" means hydrocarbons, regardless of gravity, that: 
(a) occur naturally in the gaseous phase in the reservoir; and 
(b) are separated from the natural gas as liquids through the process of condensation either in 
the reservoir, in the wellbore, or at the surface in field separators. 
(4) "Consenting owner" means an owner who consents in advance to the drilling and 
operation of a well and agrees to bear his proportionate share of the costs of the drilling and 
operation of the well. 
(5) "Crude oil" means hydrocarbons, regardless of gravity, that: 
(a) occur naturally in the liquid phase in the reservoir; and 
(b) are produced and recovered at the wellhead in liquid form. 
(6) (a) "Gas" means natural gas, as defined in Subsection (9), natural gas liquids, as defined in 
Subsection (10), other gas, as defined in Subsection (14), or any mixture of them. 
(b) "Gas" does not include any gaseous or liquid substance processed from coal, oil shale, or 
tar sands. 
(7) "Illegal oil" or "illegal gas" means oil or gas that has been produced from any well within 
the state in violation of this chapter or any rule or order of the board. 
(8) "Illegal product" means any product derived in whole or in part from illegal oil or illegal 
gas. 
(9) (a) "Natural gas" means hydrocarbons that occur naturally in the gaseous phase in the 
reservoir and are produced and recovered at the wellhead in gaseous form, except natural gas 
liquids as defined in Subsection (10) and condensate as defined in Subsection (3). 
(b) "Natural gas" includes coalbed methane gas. 
(10) "Natural gas liquids" means hydrocarbons, regardless of gravity, that are separated from 
natural gas as liquids in gas processing plants through the process of condensation, absorption, 
(11) "Nonconsenting owner" means an owner who after written notice does not consent in 
advance to the drilling and operation of a well or agree to bear his proportionate share of the 
costs. 
(12) (a) "Oil" means crude oil, as defined in Subsection (5), condensate, as defined in 
Subsection (3), or any mixture of them. 
(b) "Oil" does not include any gaseous or liquid substance processed from coal, oil shale, or 
tar sands. 
(13) (a) "Oil and gas proceeds" means any payment that: 
(i) derives from oil and gas production from any well located in the state; 
(ii) is expressed as a right to a specified interest in the: 
(A) cash proceeds received from the sale of the oil and gas; or 
(B) the cash value of the oil and gas; and 
(iii) is subject to any tax withheld from the payment pursuant to law. 
(b) "Oil and gas proceeds" includes a royalty interest, overriding royalty interest, production 
payment interest, or working interest. 
(c) "Oil and gas proceeds" does not include a net profits interest or other interest the extent of 
which cannot be determined with reference to a specified share of: 
(i) the cash proceeds received from the sale of the oil and gas; or 
(ii) the cash value of the oil and gas. 
(14) (a) "Other gas" means nonhydrocarbon gases that: 
(i) occur naturally in the gaseous phase in the reservoir; or 
(ii) are injected into the reservoir in connection with pressure maintenance, gas cycling, or 
other secondary or enhanced recovery projects. 
(b) "Other gas" includes hydrogen sulfide, carbon dioxide, helium, and nitrogen. 
(15) "Owner" means the person who has the right: 
(a) to drill into and produce from a reservoir; and 
(b) appropriate the oil and gas produced for himself or for himself and others. 
(16) "Operator" means the person who has been designated by the owners or the board to 
operate a well or unit. 
(17) "Payor" means the person who undertakes to distribute oil and gas proceeds to the 
persons entitled to them, whether as the first purchaser of that production, as operator of the well 
from which the production was obtained, or as lessee under the lease on which royalty is due. 
(18) "Pool" means an underground reservoir containing a common accumulation of oil or gas 
or both. Each zone of a general structure that is completely separated from any other zone in the 
structure is a separate pool. "Common source of supply" and "reservoir" are synonymous with 
"pool." 
(19) "Pooling" means the bringing together of separately owned interests for the common 
development and operation of a drilling unit. 
(20) "Producer" means the owner or operator of a well capable of producing oil and gas. 
(21) "Product" means any commodity made from oil and gas. 
(22) "Waste" means: 
(a) the inefficient, excessive, or improper use or the unnecessary dissipation of oil or gas or 
reservoir energy; 
(b) the inefficient storing of oil or gas; 
(c) the locating, drilling, equipping, operating, or producing of any oil or gas well in a manner 
that causes: 
(i) a reduction in the quantity of oil or gas ultimately recoverable from a reservoir under 
prudent and economical operations; 
(ii) unnecessary wells to be drilled; or 
(iii) the loss or destruction of oil or gas either at the surface or subsurface; or 
(d) the production of oil or gas in excess of: 
(i) transportation or storage facilities; or 
(ii) the amount reasonably required to be produced as a result of the proper drilling, 
completing, testing, or operating of a well or otherwise utilized on the lease from which it is 
produced. 
40-6-3. Waste prohibited. 
The waste of oil or gas is prohibited. 
40-6-4. Board of Oil, Gas and Mining created - Functions - Appointment of members -
Terms - Chair - Quorum - Expenses. 
(1) There is created within the Department of Natural Resources the Board of Oil Gas and 
Mining. The board shall be the policy making body for the Division of Oil, Gas and Mining. 
(2) The board shall consist of seven members appointed by the governor, with the advice and 
consent of the senate. No more than four members shall be from the same political party. The 
members shall have the following qualifications: 
(a) two members knowledgeable in mining matters; 
(b) two members knowledgeable in oil and gas matters; 
(c) one member knowledgeable in ecological and environmental matters; 
(d) one member who is a private land owner, owns a mineral or royalty interest and is 
knowledgeable in those interests; and 
(e) one member who is knowledgeable in geological matters. 
(3) (a) Except as required by Subsection (b), as terms of current board members expire, the 
governor shall appoint each new member or reappointed member to a four-year term. 
(b) Notwithstanding the requirements of Subsection (a), the governor shall, at the time of 
appointment or reappointment, adjust the length of terms to ensure that the terms of board 
members are staggered so that approximately half of the board is appointed every two years. 
(4) (a) When a vacancy occurs in the membership for any reason, the replacement shall be 
appointed for the unexpired term by the governor, with the advice and consent of the Senate. 
(b) The person appointed shall have the same qualifications as his predecessor. 
(5) The board shall appoint its chair from the membership. Four members of the board shall 
constitute a quorum for the transaction of business and the holding of hearings. 
(6) (a) (i) Members who are not government employees shall receive no compensation or 
benefits for their services, but may receive per diem and expenses incurred in the performance of 
•u~ ™*mWo nffi™i duties at the rates established by the Division of Finance under Sections 
(ii) Members may decline to receive per diem and expenses for their service. 
(b) (i) State government officer and employee members who do not receive salary, per diem, 
or expenses from their agency for their service may receive per diem and expenses incurred in the 
performance of their official duties from the board at the rates established by the Division of 
Finance under Sections 63A-3-106 and 63A-3-107. 
(ii) State government officer and employee members may decline to receive per diem and 
expenses for their service. 
40-6-5, Jurisdiction of board - Rules. 
(1) The board has jurisdiction over all persons and property necessary to enforce this chapter. 
The board shall enact rules in accordance with the Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act. 
(2) The board shall adopt rules and make orders as necessary to administer the following 
provisions: 
(a) Ownership of all facilities for the production, storage, treatment, transportation, refining, 
or processing of oil and gas shall be identified. 
(b) Well logs, directional surveys, and reports on well location, drilling, and production shall 
be made and filed with the division. Logs of wells marked "confidential" shall be kept confidential 
for one year after the date on which the log is required to be filed, unless the operator gives 
written permission to release the log at an earlier date. Production reports shall be: 
(i) filed monthly; 
(ii) accurate; and 
(iii) in a form that reasonably serves the needs of state agencies and private fee owners. 
(c) Monthly reports from gas processing plants shall be filed with the division. 
(d) Wells shall be drilled, cased, operated, and plugged in such manner as to prevent: 
(i) the escape of oil, gas, or water out of the reservoir in which they are found into another 
formation; 
(ii) the detrimental intrusion of water into an oil or gas reservoir; 
(iii) the pollution of fresh water supplies by oil, gas, or salt water; 
(iv) blowouts; 
(v) cavings; 
(vi) seepages; and 
(vii) fires. 
(e) The drilling of wells shall not commence without an adequate and approved supply of 
water as required by Title 73, Chapter 3. This provision is not intended to impose any additional 
legal requirements, but to assure that existing legal requirements concerning the use of water have 
been met prior to the commencement of drilling. 
(f) The operator shall furnish a reasonable performance bond or other good and sufficient 
surety, conditioned for the performance of the duty to: 
(i) plug each dry or abandoned well; 
(ii) repair each well causing waste or pollution; and 
(iii) maintain and restore the well site. 
(g) Production from wells shall be separated into oil and gas and measured by means and upon 
standards that will be prescribed by the board and will reflect current industry standards. 
(h) Crude oil obtained from any reserve pit, disposal pond or pit, or similar facility, and any 
accumulation of nonmerchantable waste crude oil shall be treated and processed, as prescribed by 
the board. 
(i) Any person who produces, sells, purchases, acquires, stores, transports, refines, or 
processes oil or gas or injects fluids for cycling, pressure maintenance, secondary or enhanced 
for a period of at least six years. The records shall be available for examination by the board or its 
agents at any reasonable time. Rules enacted to administer this subsection shall be consistent with 
applicable federal requirements. 
(j) Any person with an interest in a lease shall be notified when all or part of that interest in the 
lease is sold or transferred. 
(3) The board has the authority to regulate: 
(a) all operations for and related to the production of oil or gas including: 
(i) drilling, testing, equipping, completing, operating, producing, and plugging of wells; and 
(ii) reclamation of sites; 
(b) the spacing and location of wells; 
(c) operations to increase ultimate recovery, such as: 
(i) cycling of gas; 
(ii) the maintenance of pressure; and 
(iii) the introduction of gas, water, or other substances into a reservoir; 
(d) the disposal of salt water and oil-field wastes; 
(e) the underground and surface storage of oil, gas, or products; and 
(f) the flaring of gas from an oil well. 
(4) For the purposes of administering this chapter, the board may designate: 
(a) wells as: 
(i) oil wells; or 
(ii) gas wells; and 
(b) pools as: 
(i) oil pools; or 
(ii) gas pools. 
(5) The board has exclusive jurisdiction over: 
(a) class II injection wells, as defined by the federal Environmental Protection Agency or any 
successor agency; and 
(b) pits and ponds in relation to these injection wells. 
(6) The board has jurisdiction: 
(a) to hear any questions regarding multiple mineral development conflicts with oil and gas 
operations if there: 
(i) is potential injury to other mineral deposits on the same lands; or 
(ii) are simultaneous or concurrent operations conducted by other mineral owners or lessees 
affecting the same lands; and 
(b) to enter its order or rule with respect to those questions. 
(7) The board has enforcement powers with respect to operators of minerals other than oil 
and gas as are set forth in Section 40-6-11, for the sole purpose of enforcing multiple mineral 
development issues. 
40-6-6, Drilling units - Establishment by board - Modifications - Prohibitions. 
(1) The board may order the establishment of drilling units for any pool. 
(2) Within each drilling unit, only one well may be drilled for production from the common 
source of supply, except as provided in Subsection (6). 
(3) A drilling unit may not be smaller than the maximum area that can be efficiently and 
economically drained by one well. 
(4) (a) Each drilling unit within a pool shall be of uniform size and shape, unless the board 
finds that it must make an exception due to geologic, geographic, or other factors. 
(b) If the board finds it necessary to divide a pool into zones and establish drilling units for 
each zone, drilling units may differ in size and shape for each zone. 
(5) An order of the board that establishes drilling units for a pool shall: 
(a) be made upon terms and conditions that are just and reasonable; 
(b) include all lands determined by the board to overlay the pool; 
(c) specify the acreage and shape of each drilling unit as determined by the board; and 
(d) specify the location of the well in terms of distance from drilling unit boundaries and other 
wells. 
(6) The board may modify an order that establishes drilling units for a pool to provide for: 
(a) an exception to the authorized location of a well; 
(b) the inclusion of additional areas which the board determines overlays the pool; 
(c) the increase or decrease of the size of drilling units; or 
(d) the drilling of additional wells within drilling units. 
(7) (a) After an order establishing drilling units has been entered by the board, the drilling of 
any well into the pool at a location other than that authorized by the order is prohibited. 
(b) The operation of any well drilled in violation of an order fixing drilling units is prohibited. 
40-6-6.5- Pooling of interests for the development and operation of a drilling unit -
Board may order pooling of interests - Payment of costs and royalty interests - Monthly 
accounting. 
(1) Two or more owners within a drilling unit may bring together their interests for the 
development and operation of the drilling unit. 
(2) (a) In the absence of a written agreement for pooling, the board may enter an order 
pooling all interests in the drilling unit for the development and operation of the drilling unit. 
(b) The order shall be made upon terms and conditions that are just and reasonable. 
(c) The board may adopt terms appearing in an operating agreement: 
(i) for the drilling unit that is in effect between the consenting owners; 
(ii) submitted by any party to the proceeding; or 
(iii) submitted by its own motion. 
(3) (a) Operations incident to the drilling of a well upon any portion of a drilling unit covered 
by a pooling order shall be deemed for all purposes to be the conduct of the operations upon each 
separately owned tract in the drilling unit by the several owners. 
(b) The portion of the production allocated or applicable to a separately owned tract included 
in a drilling unit covered by a pooling order shall, when produced, be deemed for all purposes to 
have been produced from that tract by a well drilled on it. 
(4) (a) (i) Each pooling order shall provide for the payment of just and reasonable costs 
incurred in the drilling and operating of the drilling unit including, but not limited to: 
(A) the costs of drilling, completing, equipping, producing, gathering, transporting, 
processing, marketing, and storage facilities; 
(B) reasonable charges for the administration and supervision of operations; and 
(C) other costs customarily incurred in the industry. 
(ii) An owner is not liable under a pooling order for costs or losses resulting from the gross 
negligence or willful misconduct of the operator. 
(b) Each pooling order shall provide for reimbursement to the consenting owners for any 
nonconsenting owner's share of the costs out of production from the drilling unit attributable to 
his tract. 
(c) Each pooling order shall provide that each consenting owner shall own and be entitled to 
receive, subject to royalty or similar obligations: 
(i) the share of the production of the well applicable to his interest in the drilling unit; and 
(ii) unless he has agreed otherwise, his proportionate part of the nonconsenting owner's share 
of the production until costs are recovered as provided in Subsection (d). 
(d) (i) Each pooling order shall provide that each nonconsenting owner shall be entitled to 
receive, subject to royalty or similar obligations, the share of the production of the well applicable 
to his interest in the drilling unit after the consenting owners have recovered from the 
nonconsenting owner's share of production the following amounts less any cash contributions 
made by the nonconsenting owner: 
(A) 100% of the nonconsenting owner's share of the cost of surface equipment beyond the 
wellhead connections, including stock tanks, separators, treaters, pumping equipment, and piping; 
(B) 100% of the nonconsenting owner's share of the estimated cost to plug and abandon the 
well as determined by the board; 
(C) 100% of the nonconsenting owner's share of the cost of operation of the well commencing 
with first production and continuing until the consenting owners have recovered all costs; and 
(D) an amount to be determined by the board but not less than 150% nor greater than 300% 
of the nonconsenting owner's share of the costs of staking the location, wellsite preparation, 
rights-of-way, rigging up, drilling, reworking, recompleting, deepening or plugging back, testing, 
and completing, and the cost of equipment in the well to and including the wellhead connections. 
(ii) The nonconsenting owner's share of the costs specified in Subsection (i) is that interest 
which would have been chargeable to the nonconsenting owner had he initially agreed to pay his 
share of the costs of the well from commencement of the operation. 
(iii) A reasonable interest charge may be included if the board finds it appropriate. 
(e) If there is any dispute about costs, the board shall determine the proper costs. 
(5) If a nonconsenting owner's tract in the drilling unit is subject to a lease or other contract 
for the development of oil and gas, the pooling order shall provide that the consenting owners 
shall pay any royalty interest or other interest in the tract not subject to the deduction of the costs 
of production from the production attributable to that tract. 
(6) (a) If a nonconsenting owner's tract in the drilling unit is not subject to a lease or other 
contract for the development of oil and gas, the pooling order shall provide that the 
nonconsenting owner shall receive as a royalty the average landowner's royalty attributable to 
each tract within the drilling unit. 
(b) The royalty shall be: 
(i) determined prior to the commencement of drilling; and 
(ii) paid from production attributable to each tract until the consenting owners have recovered 
the costs specified in Subsection (4)(d). 
(7) The operator of a well under a pooling order in which there are nonconsenting owners 
shall furnish the nonconsenting owners with monthly statements specifying: 
(a) costs incurred; 
(b) the quantity of oil or gas*produced; and 
(c) the amount of oil and gas proceeds realized from the sale of the production during the 
preceding month. 
(8) Each pooling order shall provide that when the consenting owners recover from a 
nonconsenting owner's relinquished interest the amounts provided for in Subsection (4)(d): 
(a) the relinquished interest of the nonconsenting owner shall automatically revert to him; 
(b) the nonconsenting owner shall from that time: 
(i) own the same interest in the well and the production from it; and 
(ii) be liable for the further costs of the operation as if he had participated in the initial drilling 
and operation; and 
(c) costs are payable out of production unless otherwise agreed between the nonconsenting 
owner and the operator. 
(9) Each pooling order shall provide that in any circumstance where the nonconsenting owner 
has relinquished his share of production to consenting owners or at any time fails to take his share 
of production in-kind when he is entitled to do so, the nonconsenting owner is entitled to: 
(a) an accounting of the oil and gas proceeds applicable to his relinquished share of 
production; and 
(b) payment of the oil and gas proceeds applicable to that share of production not taken 
in-kind, net of costs. 
40-6-7. Agreements for repressuring or pressure maintenance or cycling or recycling 
operations - Plan for development and operation of pool or field. 
(1) An agreement for repressuring or pressure maintenance operations, cycling or recycling 
operations, including the extraction and separation of liquid hydrocarbons from natural gas, or for 
carrying on any other methods of unit or cooperative development or operation of a field or pool 
or a part of either, is authorized and may be performed, and shall not be held or construed to 
violate any statutes relating to trusts, monopolies, or contracts and combinations in restraint of 
trade, if the agreement is approved by the board as being in the public interest and promotes 
conservation, increases ultimate recovery and prevents waste of oil or gas provided the agreement 
protects the correlative rights of each owner or producer. 
(2) A plan for the development and operation of a pool or field shall be presented to the 
board and may be approved after notice and hearing. 
40-6-8. Field or pool units - Procedure for establishment - Operation. 
(1) The board may hold a hearing to consider the need for the operation as a unit of one or 
more pools or parts of them in a field. 
(2) The board shall make an order providing for the unit operation of a pool or part of it, if 
the board finds that: 
(a) Such operation is reasonably necessary for the purposes of this chapter; and 
(b) The value of the estimated additional recovery of oil or gas substantially exceeds the 
estimated additional cost incident to conducting such operations. 
(3) The order shall prescribe a plan for unit operations that shall include: 
(a) a description of the lands and of the pool or pools or parts of them to be so operated, 
termed the unit area; 
(b) a statement of the nature of the operations contemplated; 
(c) an allocation to the separately owned tracts in the unit area of all the oil and gas that is 
produced from the unit area and is saved, being the production that is not used in the conduct of 
operations on the unit area or not unavoidably lost. The allocation shall be in accord with the 
agreement, if any, of the interested parties. If there is no such agreement, the board shall 
determine the relative value, from evidence introduced at the hearing of the separately owned 
tracts in the unit area, exclusive of physical equipment, for development of oil and gas by unit 
operations, and the production allocated to each tract shall be the proportion that the relative 
value of each tract so determined bears to the relative value of all tracts in the unit area; 
(d) a provision for adjustment among the owners of the unit area (not including royalty 
owners) of their respective investment in wells, tanks, pumps, machinery, materials, equipment, 
and other things and services of value attributable to the unit operations. The amount to be 
charged unit operations for any such item shall be determined by the owners of the unit area (not 
including royalty owners); but if the owners of the unit area are unable to agree upon the amount 
or correctness, the board shall determine them. The net amount charged against the owner of an 
interest in a separately owned tract shall be considered expense of unit operation chargeable 
against his interest in the tract. The adjustments provided for may be treated separately and 
handled by agreements separate from the unitization agreement; 
(e) a provision providing how the costs of unit operations, including capital investments, shall 
be determined and charged to the separately owned tracts and how these costs shall be paid, 
including a provision providing a procedure for the unit production allocated to an owner who 
does not pay the share of the cost of unit operations charged to such owner, or the interest of 
such owner, to be sold and the proceeds applied to the payment of such costs. The operator of the 
unit shall have a first and prior lien for costs incurred pursuant to the plan of unitization upon each 
owner's oil and gas rights and his share of unitized production to secure the payment of such 
owner's proportionate part of the cost of developing and operating the unit area. This lien may be 
established and enforced in the same manner as provided by Sections 38-1-8 to 38-1-26 inclusive. 
For such purposes any nonconsenting owner shall be deemed to have contracted with the unit 
operator for his proportionate part of the cost of developing and operating the unit area. A 
transfer or conversion of any owner's interest or any portion of it, however accomplished, after 
the effective date of the order creating the unit, shall not relieve the transferred interest of the 
operator's lien on said interest for the cost and expense of unit operations; 
(f) a provision, if necessary, for carrying or otherwise financing any owner who elects to be 
carried or otherwise financed, allowing a reasonable interest charge for such service payable out 
of such owner's share of the production; 
(g) a provision for the supervision and conduct of the unit operations, in respect to which each 
owner shall have a percentage vote corresponding to the percentage of the costs of unit 
operations chargeable against the interest of the owner; 
(h) the time when the unit operations shall commence, and the manner in which, and the 
circumstances under which, the unit operations shall terminate; 
(i) such additional provisions that are found to be appropriate for carrying on the unit 
operations, and for the protection of correlative rights; and 
(j) the designation of a unit operator. 
(4) No order of the board providing for unit operations of a pool or pools shall become 
effective unless and until the plan for unit operations prescribed by the division has been approved 
in writing by those owners who, under the board's order, will be required to pay 70% of the costs 
of the unit operation, and also by the owners of 70% of the production or proceeds that will be 
credited to interests which are free of cost, such as royalties, overriding royalties, and production 
payments, and the board has made a finding, either in the order providing for unit operations or in 
a supplemental order, that the plan for unit operations has been so approved. If the persons 
owning required percentage of interest in that unit area do not approve the plan for unit 
operations within a period of six months from the date on which the order providing for unit 
operations is made, the order shall be ineffective and shall be revoked by the board unless for 
good cause shown the board extends this time. 
(5) An order providing for unit operations may be amended by an order made by the board in 
the same manner and subject to the same conditions as an original order providing for unit 
operations, provided: 
(a) If such an amendment affects only the rights and interests of the owners, the approval of 
the amendment by the owners of royalty, overriding royalty, production payments and other such 
interests which are free of costs shall not be required. 
(b) No such order of amendment shall change the percentage for the allocation of oil and gas 
as established for any separately owned tract by the original order, or change the percentage for 
allocation of cost as established for any separately owned tract by the original order. 
(6) The board, by an order, may provide for the unit operation of a pool or pools or parts 
thereof that embrace a unit area established by a previous order of the division. The order, in 
providing for the allocation of unit production, shall first treat the unit area previously established 
as a single tract, and the portion of the unit production allocated shall then be allocated among the 
separately owned tracts included in the previously established unit area in the same proportions of 
those specified in the previous order. 
(7) An order may provide for unit operations on less than the whole of a pool where the unit 
area is of such size and shape as may be reasonably required for that purpose, and the conduct 
will have no adverse effect upon other portions of the pool. 
(8) All operations, including, but not limited to, the commencement, drilling, or operation of 
a well upon any portion of the unit area shall be deemed for all purposes the conduct of such 
operations upon each separately owned tract in the unit area by the several owners. The portions 
of the unit production allocated to a separately owned tract in a unit area shall, when produced, 
be deemed, for all purposes, to have been actually produced from such tract by a well drilled. 
Operations conducted pursuant to an order of the board providing for unit operations shall 
constitute a fulfillment of all the express or implied obligations for each lease or contract covering 
lands in the unit area to the extent that compliance with such obligations cannot be had because of 
the order of the board. 
(9) The portion of the unit production allocated to any tract, and the proceeds from the sale, 
shall be the property and income of the several owners, subject to the rights of royalty owners, to 
whom, or to whose credit, they are allocated or payable under the order providing for unit 
operations. 
(10) No division order or other contract relating to the sale or purchase of production from a 
separately owned tract shall be terminated by the order providing for unit operations but shall 
remain in force and apply to oil and gas allocated to such tract until terminated in accordance with 
the provisions thereof. 
(11) Except to the extent that the parties affected agree and as provided in (e) of Subsection 
(3) of this section, no order providing for unit operations shall be construed to result in a transfer 
of all or any part of the title of any person to the oil and gas rights in any tract in the unit area. All 
property, whether real or personal, that may be acquired in the conduct of unit operations 
hereunder shall be acquired for the account of the owners within the unit area and shall be the 
property of the owners in the proportion that the expenses of unit operations are charged, unless 
otherwise provided in the plan of unit operation. 
(12) This section shall apply only to field or pool units and shall not apply to the unitization 
of interests within a drilling unit as may be authorized and governed under the provisions of 
Section 40-6-6. 
40-6-9- Proceeds from sale of production - Payment of proceeds - Requirements -
Proceeding on petition to determine cause of nonpayment - Remedies - Penalties. 
(1) (a) The oil and gas proceeds derived from the sale of production from any well producing 
oil or gas in the state shall be paid to any person legally entitled to the payment of the proceeds 
not later than 180 days after the first day of the month following the date of the first sale and 
thereafter not later than 30 days after the end of the calendar month within which payment is 
received by the payor for production, unless other periods or arrangements are provided for in a 
valid contract with the person entitled to the proceeds. 
(b) The payment shall be made directly to the person entitled to the payment by the payor. 
(c) The payment is considered to have been made upon deposit in the United States mail. 
(2) Payments shall be remitted to any person entitled to oil and gas proceeds annually for the 
aggregate of up to 12 months accumulation of proceeds, if the total amount owed is $100 or less. 
(3) (a) Any delay in determining whether a person is legally entitled to an interest in the oil 
and gas proceeds does not affect payments to other persons entitled to payment. 
(b) (i) If accrued payments cannot be made within the time limits specified in Subsection (1) 
or (2), the payor shall deposit all oil and gas proceeds credited to the eventual oil and gas 
proceeds owner to an escrow account in a federally insured bank or savings and loan institution 
using a standard escrow document form. 
(ii) The deposit shall earn interest at the highest rate being offered by that institution for the 
amount and term of similar demand deposits. 
(iii) The escrow agent may commingle money received into escrow from any one lessee or 
operator, purchaser, or other person legally responsible for payment. 
(iv) Payment of principal and accrued interest from the escrow account shall be made by the 
escrow agent to the person legally entitled to them within 30 days from the date of receipt by the 
escrow agent of final legal determination of entitlement to the payment. 
(v) Aoolicable escrow fees ^hall lv» A^A^nt^A fr^m *u<* ~^~~™*« 
(4) Any person entitled to oil and gas proceeds may file a petition with the board to conduct a 
hearing to determine why the proceeds have not been paid. 
(5) Upon receipt of the petition, the board shall set the matter for investigation and 
negotiation by the division within 60 days. 
(6) (a) If the matter cannot be resolved by negotiation as of that date, the board may set a 
hearing within 30 days. 
(b) If the board does not set a hearing, any information gathered during the investigation and 
negotiation shall be given to the petitioner who may then seek a remedy in a court of competent 
jurisdiction. 
(7) (a) If, after a hearing, the board finds the proceeds have not been deposited in an interest 
bearing escrow account in accordance with Subsection (3), the board may order that: 
(i) a complete accounting be made; and 
(ii) the proceeds be subject to an interest rate of 1 1/2% per month, as a substitute for an 
escrow account interest rate, accruing from the date the payment should have been suspended in 
accordance with Subsection (3).^ 
(b) If, after a hearing, the board finds the delay of payment is without reasonable justification, 
the board may: 
(i) if the proceeds have been deposited in an interest bearing escrow account in accordance 
with Subsection (3): 
(A) order a complete accounting; 
(B) require the proceeds and accruing interest to remain in the escrow account; and 
(C) assess a penalty of up to 25% of the total proceeds and interest in the escrow account; or 
(ii) if the proceeds have not been deposited in an interest bearing escrow account in 
accordance with Subsection (3), assess a penalty of up to 25% of the total proceeds and interest 
as determined under Subsection (a). 
(c) (i) Upon finding that the delay of payment is without reasonable justification, the board 
shall set a date not later than 90 days from the hearing for final distribution of the total sum. 
(ii) If payment is not made by the required date, the total proceeds, interest, and any penalty 
as provided in Subsection (b) shall be subject to interest at a rate of 1 1/2% per month until paid. 
(d) If, after a hearing, the board finds the delay of payment is with reasonable justification and 
the proceeds have been deposited in an interest bearing escrow account in accordance with 
Subsection (3), the payor may not be required to make an accounting or payment of appropriately 
suspended proceeds until the condition which justified suspension has been satisfied. 
(8) The circumstances under which the board may find the suspension of payment of 
proceeds is made with reasonable justification, such that the penalty provisions of Subsections 
(7)(b) and (7)(c)(ii) do not apply, include, but are not limited to, the following: 
(a) the payor: 
(i) fails to make the payment in good faith reliance upon a title opinion by a licensed Utah 
attorney objecting to the lack of good and marketable title of record of the person claiming 
entitlement to payment; and 
(ii) furnishes a copy of the relevant portions of the opinion to the person for necessary 
curative action; 
(b) the payor receives information which: 
(i) in the payor's good faith judgment, brings into question the entitlement of the person 
claiming the right to the payment to receive that payment; 
(ii) has rendered the title unmarketable; or 
(iii) may expose the payor to the risk of liability to third parties if the payment is made; 
(c) the total amount of oil and gas proceeds in possession of the payor owed to the person 
making claim to payment is less than $100 at the end of any month; or 
(d) the person entitled to payment has failed or refused to execute a division or transfer order 
acknowledging the proper interest to which the person claims to be entitled and setting forth the 
mailing address to which payment may be directed, provided the division or transfer order does 
not alter or amend the terms of the lease. 
(9) If the circumstances described in Subsection (8)(a) or (b) arise, the payor may: 
(a) suspend and escrow the payments in accordance with Subsection (3); or 
(b) at the request and expense of the person claiming entitlement to the payment, make the 
payment into court on an interpleader action to resolve the claim and avoid UabiUty under this 
chapter. 
40-6-9.1. Payment information to royalty owners. 
(1) When payment is made to an owner of a royalty interest for the sale of oil or gas 
produced from that royalty interest pursuant to the requirements of Section 40-6-9, the foUowing 
information shaU be included on the payor's check stub or on an attachment to the form of 
payment: 
(a) the lease, property, or weU name, and any lease, property, or weU identification number 
from which production is attributed; 
(b) the month and year of the sales included in the payment; 
(c) the total volume of oil or gas sold, as measured by the means and upon the standards 
prescribed by the board pursuant to Subsection 40-6-5(2)(g); 
(d) the average price per unit of oil or gas sold; 
(e) the total amount of state severance, ad valorem, and other production taxes; 
(f) a Ust of any other deductions or adjustments; 
(g) the net value of total sales after taxes are deducted; 
(h) the royalty owner's interest, expressed as a decimal number, in sales from the lease, 
property, or weU; 
(i) the royalty owner's share of the total value of sales prior to any deductions; 
(j) the royalty owner's proportionate share of the sales value less the royalty owner's 
proportionate share of the deductions, as appUcable; and 
(k) an address at which additional information pertaining to the royalty owner's interest in 
production may be obtained and questions may be answered. 
(2) (a) A royalty owner who fails to receive the information required by this section may 
notify the board by certified mail of the problem and request that the division conduct an 
investigation. 
(b) The division shaU conduct the investigation and report to the board concerning: 
(i) whether the matter has been resolved; or 
(u) whether further action is necessary and its recommendations for resolution of the matter. 
(c) The board may take any action it considers necessary to resolve the matter pursuant to the 
provisions of this chapter. 
(3) A royalty owner damaged by a violation of this section may proceed as provided in 
Subsection 40-6-11(7). 
40-6-9.5. Permits for crude oil production - Application - Bond requirement - Closure of 
facilities - Availability of records. 
(1) The division may issue permits authorizing construction, operation, maintenance, and 
cessation of treating facilities and operations covered by Subsection 40-6-5(2)(h) and to approve, 
as part of that permit, post-cessation reclamation of the site. 
(2) Each owner and operator of any facility described in Subsection 40-6-5(2)(h) or planning 
to construct, operate, or maintain a facility described in Subsection 40-6-5(2)(h) shall submit to 
the division an application stating in detail the location, type, and capacity of the facility 
contemplated; the extent and location of area disturbed or to be disturbed including, but not 
limited to, any pits, ponds, or lands, associated with the facility; a plan for reclamation of the site; 
and other materials required fey the division. All existing facilities described in Subsection 
40-6-5(2)(h) shall submit plans by July 28, 1985. Application for all planned facilities must be 
approved and a permit issued before any ground clearing or construction may occur. 
(3) As a condition for approval of any permit, the owner and operator shall post a bond in an 
amount determined by the division to cover reclamation costs for the site. Approval of any permit 
is also conditioned upon compliance with all laws, rules, and orders of the board. Failure to post 
the bond is considered sufficient grounds to deny a permit. 
(4) The board may order the closure of any facility described in Subsection 40-6-5(2)(h) if an 
application is not forthcoming in the time allowed in Subsection (2), a bond is not posted, a 
violation of the rules and regulations of other state or federal agencies exists, or for other material 
and substantial cause. 
(5) The owner and operator are subject to all applicable state, federal, and local rules and 
regulations. 
(6) The records required to be kept by Subsection 40-6-5(2)(i) shall be available for 
inspection and audit by the board or its agents during reasonable working hours. 
40-6-10. Procedures - Adjudicative proceedings - Emergency orders - Hearing 
examiners. 
(1) (a) The Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining and the Division of Oil, Gas, and Mining shall 
comply with the procedures and requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b, in their adjudicative 
proceedings. 
(b) The board shall enact rules governing its practice and procedure that are not inconsistent 
with Title 63, Chapter 46b. 
(2) When an emergency requiring immediate action is found by the division director or any 
board member to exist, he may issue an emergency order according to the requirements and 
procedures of Title 63, Chapter 46b. 
(3) Any notice required by this chapter, except as otherwise provided, shall be given at the 
election of the board either by personal service or by one publication in a daily newspaper of 
general circulation in the city of Salt Lake and county of Salt Lake, Utah, and in all newspapers of 
general circulation published in the county where the land is affected, or some part of the land is 
situated. 
(4) (a) Any order made by the board is effective on issuance, 
(b) All rules and orders issued by the board shall be: 
(i) in writing; 
(iv) public records open for inspection at all times during reasonable office hours, 
(c) A copy of any rule, finding of fact, or order, certified by the board or by the division 
director, shall be received in evidence in all courts of this state with the same effect as the original. 
(5) The board may act upon its own motion or upon the petition of any interested person. 
(6) (a) The board may appoint a hearing examiner to take evidence and to recommend 
findings of fact and conclusions of law to the board. 
(b) Any member of the board, division staff, or any other person designated by the board may 
serve as a hearing examiner. 
(c) The board may enter an order based on the recommendations of the examiner. 
40-6-11. Power to summon witnesses, administer oaths and require production of 
records - Enforcement - Penalties for violation of chapter or rules - Illegal oil or gas - Civil 
liability. 
(1) The board may summon witnesses, administer oaths, and require the production of 
records, books, and documents for examination at any hearing or investigation conducted by it. 
(2) (a) If any person fails or refuses to comply with a subpoena issued by the board, or fails 
or refuses to testify about any matter, the board may apply to any district court in the state for an 
order compelling that person to comply with the subpoena, and to attend before the board and 
produce the subpoenaed records, books, and documents for examination, and to give his 
testimony. 
(b) The court may punish the person for contempt as if he disobeyed a subpoena issued by the 
court, or if he refused to testify in a court. 
(3) (a) Whenever it appears that any person is violating any provision of this chapter or any 
rule or order made under the authority of this chapter, the board may issue an order requiring 
compliance within a period not to exceed 30 days. 
(b) The board may bring suit in the name of the state against any person violating this chapter, 
or rules or orders made under the authority of this chapter if: 
(i) the violation continues after expiration of the time period granted in Subsection (3)(a); 
(ii) the violation presents an immediate threat to public health, safety, or welfare; or 
(iii) the violation would cause waste. 
(4) (a) If the board determines, after an adjudicative proceeding, that any person has violated 
any provision of this chapter, or any permit, rule, or order made under the provisions of this 
chapter, that person is subject, in a civil proceeding, to a penalty not exceeding $5,000 per day for 
each day of violation. 
(b) If the board determines that the violation is willful, that person may be fined not more than 
$10,000 for each day of violation. 
(5) If ordered to do so by the board, the director of the division may order the immediate 
closure or shutdown of any well that is operating in violation of the provisions of this chapter, if 
the closure or shutdown will not cause waste or is necessary because of an immediate threat to 
public health, safety, or welfare. 
(6) (a) No person may sell, purchase, acquire, transport, refine, process, or handle illegal oil, 
gas, or product, if the person knows or has reason to know that the oil, gas, or product is illegal 
(b) The court in the district where the illegal oil, gas, or product is found, shall, after notice 
and hearing in an action brought by the board, order the product to be seized and sold, and the 
proceeds returned or held for the legal owner. 
(7) (a) Nothing in this chapter, and no suit by or against the board, and no violation charged 
or asserted against any person under any provisions of this chapter, or any rule or order issued 
under the authority of this chapter, shall impair, abridge, or delay any cause of action for damages 
that any person may have or assert against any person violating any provision of this chapter, or 
any rule or order issued under the authority of this chapter. 
(b) Any person damaged by any violation may sue for and recover whatever damages that he 
otherwise may be entitled to receive. 
40-6-12. Evasion of chapter or rules - Penalties - Limitation of actions, 
(1) (a) A person is guilty of a class A misdemeanor if, for the purpose of evading this chapter 
or any rule or order of the board, he is convicted of any of the following: 
(i) making or causing to be made any false entry in any report, record, account, or 
memorandum required by this chapter or by any rule or order; 
(ii) omitting or causing to be omitted from any report, record, account, or memorandum, full, 
true, and correct entries as required by this chapter or by any rule or order; or 
(iii) removing from this state or destroying, mutilating, altering, or falsifying any record, 
account, or memorandum. 
(b) Upon conviction, that person is subject to a fine of not more than $5,000 or imprisonment 
for a term not exceeding six months, or to both fine and imprisonment. 
(2) No suit, action, or other proceeding based upon a violation of this chapter or any rule or 
order of the board may be commenced or maintained unless it is commenced within one year from 
the date of the alleged violation. 
40-6-13. Restrictions of production not authorized. 
This act shall never be construed to require, permit or authorize the board or any court to 
make, enter or enforce any order, rule, regulation, or judgment requiring restriction of production 
of any pool or of any well (except a well drilled in violation of Section 40-6-6 hereof) to an 
amount less than the well or pool can produce unless such restriction is necessary to prevent 
waste and protect correlative rights, or the operation of a well without sufficient oil or gas 
production to cover current operating costs and provide a reasonable return, without regard to 
original drilling costs. 
40-6-14. Fee on oil and gas at well - Collection - Penalty and interest on delinquencies -
Payment when product taken in-kind - Interests exempt. 
(1) There is levied a fee of .002 of the value at the well of oil and gas: 
(a) produced and saved; 
(b) sold; or 
(c) transported from the premises in Utah where the oil or gas is produced. 
(2) (a) The State Tax Commission shall administer the collection of the fee, including any 
penalties and interest. 
(b) The monies collected shall be deposited in the Oil and Gas Conservation Account created 
in Section 40-6-14.5. 
(c) Time periods for the State Tax Commission to allow a refund or assess the fee shall be 
determined in accordance with Section 59-5-114. 
(3) (a) Each person having an ownership interest in oil or gas at the time of production shall 
be liable for a proportionate sharevof the fee equivalent to his ownership interest. 
(b) As used in this section "ownership interest" means any: 
(i) working interest; 
(ii) royalty interest; 
(iii) interest in payments out of production; or 
(iv) any other interest in the oil or gas, or in the proceeds of the oil or gas, subject to the fee. 
(4) The operator, on behalf of himself and any person having an ownership interest in the oil 
or gas, shall pay the assessed fee quarterly to the State Tax Commission on or before the 45th day 
following the quarter in which the fee accrued. 
(5) (a) Any fee not paid within the time specified shall: 
(i) carry a penalty as provided in Section 59-1-401; and 
(ii) bear interest at the rate and in the manner prescribed in Section 59-1-402. 
(b) The fee, together with the interest, shall be a lien upon the oil or gas against which it is 
levied. The operator shall deduct from any amounts due to the persons owning an interest in the 
oil or gas, or in the proceeds at the time of production, a proportionate amount of the charge 
before making payment to the persons. 
(6) (a) When product is taken in-kind by an interest owner who is not the operator and the 
operator cannot determine the value of the in-kind product, the operator shall: 
(i) report 100% of the production; 
(ii) deduct the product taken in-kind; and 
(iii) pay the levy on the difference. 
(b) The interest owner who takes the product in-kind shall file a report and pay the levy on his 
share of production excluded from the operator's report. 
(7) This section shall apply to any interest in oil or gas produced in the state except: 
(a) any interest of the United States; 
(b) any interest of the state or its political subdivisions in any oil or gas or in the proceeds; 
(c) any interest of any Indian or Indian tribe in any oil or gas or in the proceeds produced from 
land subject to the supervision of the United States; or 
(d) oil or gas used in producing or drilling operations or for repressuring or recycling 
purposes. 
40-6-14.5. Oil and Gas Conservation Account created - Contents - Use of account 
monies. 
(1) There is created within the General Fund a restricted account known as the Oil and Gas 
Conservation Account. 
(2) The contents of the account shall consist of: 
(a) revenues from the fee levied under Section 40-6-14, including any penalties or interest 
charged for delinquent payments; and 
(b) interest and earnings on account monies. 
(3) Account monies shall be used to pay for the: 
(a) administration of this chapter; and 
(b) plugging and reclamation of abandoned oil or gas wells or bore, core, or exploratory holes 
for which: 
(i) there is no reclamation sufety; or 
(ii) the forfeited surety is insufficient for plugging and reclamation. 
(4) Priority in the use of the monies shall be given to paying for the administration of this 
chapter. 
(5) Appropriations for plugging and reclamation of abandoned oil or gas wells or bore, core, 
or exploratory holes shall be nonlapsing. 
(6) The balance of the Oil and Gas Conservation Account at the end of a fiscal year may not 
exceed $750,000. Any excess monies shall be transferred to the General Fund. 
(7) (a) As used in this Subsection (7), "excess fee revenue" means revenue collected in fiscal 
year 1999-2000 from the fee levied under Section 40-6-14 that exceeds the fee revenue 
appropriated to the Division of Oil, Gas, and Mining in fiscal year 1999-2000. 
(b) If there is a General Fund surplus for fiscal year 1999-2000, the Division of Finance shall 
transfer General Fund surplus monies to the Oil and Gas Conservation Account in an amount up 
to the excess fee revenue. 
(c) The transfer provided in Subsection (7)(b) shall be made after General Fund surplus 
monies are transferred to the Budget Reserve Account pursuant to Section 63-38-2.5. 
40-6-15. Division created - Functions - Director of division - Qualifications of program 
administrators. 
There is created within the Department of Natural Resources the Division of Oil, Gas and 
Mining. The division shall implement the policies and orders of the board and perform all other 
duties delegated by the board. 
The director of the Division of Oil, Gas and Mining shall be appointed by the director of the 
Department of Natural Resources with the concurrence of the Board of Oil, Gas and Mining. The 
director shall be the executive and administrative head of the Division of Oil, Gas and Mining and 
shall be a person experienced in administration and knowledgeable in the extraction of oil, gas and 
minerals. 
Within the division, the person administering the oil and gas program shall have the technical 
background to eflSciently administer that program. The person administering the mining program 
shall have the technical background to eflSciently administer that program. 
40-6-16. Duties of division. 
In addition to the duties assigned by the board, the division shall: 
(1) develop and implement an inspection program that will include but not be limited to 
production data, pre-driUing checks, and site security reviews; 
(2) publish a monthly production report; 
(3) publish a monthly gas processing plant report; 
(4) review and evaluate, prior to a hearing, evidence submitted with the petition to be 
presented to the board; 
(5) require adequate assurance of approved water rights in accordance with rules and orders 
enacted under Section 40-6-5; and 
(6) notify the county executive of the county in which the drilling will take place in writing of 
the issuance of a drilling permit. 
40-6-17. Cooperative research and development projects. 
The Board and the Division of Oil, Gas and Mining are authorized to enter into cooperative 
agreements with the national, state or local governments, and with independent organizations and 
t tutions for the purpose of carrying out research and development experiments involving 
rgy resources to the extent that the project is funded or partially funded and approved by the 
Legislature. 
40-6-18. Lands subject to chapter. 
This act shall apply to all lands in the State of Utah, lawfully subject to its poUce power and 
shall apply to lands of the United States or the lands subject to the jurisdiction of the Umted 
States. 
Tab 2 
R649-2-9. Refusal To Agree. 
1. An owner shall be deemed to have refused to agree to bear his proportionate share of the 
costs of the drilling and operation of a well under Section 40-6-6(6) if: 
1.1. The operator of the proposed well has, in good faith, attempted to reach agreement with 
such owner for the leasing of the owner's mineral interest or for that owner's voluntary 
participation in the drilling of the well. 
1.2. The owner and the operator have been unable to agree upon terms for the leasing of the 
owner's interest or for the owner's participation in the drilling of the well. 
2. If the operator of the proposed well shall fail to attempt, in good faith, to reach agreement 
with the owner for the leasing of that owner's mineral interest or for voluntary participation by 
that owner in the well prior to the filing of a Request for Agency Action for involuntary pooling 
of interests in the drilling unit under Section 40-6-6(6) then, upon written request and after notice 
and hearing, the hearing on the Request for Agency Action for involuntary pooling may, at the 
discretion of the board or its designated hearing examiner, be delayed for a period not to exceed 
30 days, to allow for negotiations between the operator and the owner. 
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SECRETARY, BOARD OF 
OIL, GAS & MINING 
BEFORE THE BOARD OF OIL, GAS AND MINING 
DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES 
STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE REQUEST 
FOR AGENCY ACTION OF 
PATRICK HEGARTY FOR AN ORDER 
POOLING ALL INTERESTS IN THE 
ESTABLISHED SPACING UNITS FOR 
THE PRODUCTION OF GAS 
(INCLUDING COALBED METHANE) 
FROM THE FERRON FORMATION 
FROM THE NORTH HALF OF SECTION 
5, TOWNSHIP 15 SOUTH, RANGE 10 
EAST, SLB&M, CARBON COUNTY, 
UTAH. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW, AND ORDER 
DOCKET NO. 2000-009 
CAUSE NO. 243-5 
This cause came before the Utah Board of Oil, Gas & Mining ("the Board") on 
Wednesday, August 23, 2000, at 10:00 am in Salt Lake City, Utah. The following Board 
members were present and participated in the hearing: 
Dave D. Lauriski, Chairman 
Elise L. Erler 
J. James Peacock 
Raymond Murray 
Thomas Faddies recused himself and did not participate in this matter. Stephanie 
Cartwright and W. Allan Mashburn were not present. 
Attending and participating on behalf of the Division of Oil, Gas & Mining ("the 
Division") was John Baza, Associate Director. The Division and Board were represented by 
Thomas Mitchell, Assistant Attorney General, and Kurt E. Seel, Assistant Attorney General, 
respectively. 
Testifying on behalf of Petitioner Patrick Hegarty was Patrick Hegarty, Tom Mullins, and 
Glen Papp. Patrick Hegarty was represented by H. Michael Keller, Esq. of Van Cott, Bagley, 
Cornwall & MacCarthy. Landowners and other interest holders who were present and whose 
interests were represented by Patrick Hegarty and his counsel included Terry Olsen and Rita 
Beck. 
Testifying on behalf of Respondents River Gas Corporation (RGC), Texaco Exploration 
and Production ("TEXEP"), Dominion Reserves-Utah, Inc. (independently and collectively 
"Respondents") were Richard L. Sutton, Michael J. Farrens, Joseph Stephenson, and Chuck 
Snure. Respondents were represented by Frederick M. McDonald, Esq. of Pruitt, Gushee & 
Bachtell. 
The United States Bureau of Land Management ("BLM") was represented by Mr. 
Henricks. 
The Board, having received and considered the written comments and briefs, the 
testimony of witnesses and the exhibits received into evidence at the hearing, and being fully 
advised by the parties, and for good cause appearing, hereby makes the following Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. In its spacing Order entered in Cause No. 243-3 effective January 26, 2000, the 
Board established the following drilling and spacing units for the production of gas, including 
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coalbed methane, from the Ferron formation from the captioned lands: 
Unit No. Lands 
1 Lots 3 and 4, SftNWVi [NWl/4] 
(containing 157.72 acres) 
2 Lots 2 and 5-35, SW'/iNEtt [NEVq 
(containing 158.12 acres) 
In its spacing Order Cause No. 243-3 the Board expressly rejected Petitioner Hegarty's request 
that the Order be retroactively effective to the dates of first production of the 5-94 and 5-266 
wells as to each respective unit. The Board declared the Utah 5-94 well (the "5-94 well") as the 
authorized well for Unit No. 1 and the Woolstenhulme 5-266 well (the "5-266 well") as the 
authorized well for Unit No. 2. Both wells are operated by RGC as unit operator of the 
Drunkards Wash Federal Exploratory Unit (the "DW Unit"). 
2. The DW Unit was originally approved effective December 28, 1990, and is 
administered by the United States Bureau of Land Management ("BLM"). The DW Unit, after 
six expansions, now covers 90,695.25 acres in Carbon and Emery Counties. The governing Unit 
Agreement has been ratified by over ninety (90%) percent of the mineral owners and their 
lessees. The DW Unit covers oil and gas producible from all formations, including coalbed 
methane producible from the Ferron formation. 
3. The subject lands are located within, but not committed to the DW Unit. Owners 
of the uncommitted lands located within the DW Unit, include LaRue Layne, Terry T. Olsen & 
Juretta L. Olsen, Trustees under Trust Agreement dated November 5, 1985, and Trustees as 
named in that certain Warranty Deed dated September 25,1987, and recorded in Book 277, 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law, and Order 
Docket No. 2000-009 
Page 268, Carbon County Records, Morris Orvill Alexander, individually and as Trustee as 
named in that certain Warranty Deed dated September 25, 1987, and recorded in Book 277, Page 
268, Carbon County Records, Rita Beck, Ten Layne, and Kelly Layne-Benning (independently 
or collectively the "Petitioner's Landowner(s)"). All of Petitioner's Landowners are related by 
blood or marriage. Petitioner's Landowners own 65.736531% of the minerals in Unit No. 1 and 
16.28895% of the minerals in Unit No. 2. 
4. Carbon County owns 1.277511% of the minerals in Unit No. 2. As evidenced by 
Warranty Deed recorded March 20, 1992 in Book 314, Page 639, Carbon County Records, 
Carbon County conveyed this interest in Unit No. 2 to Michelle Lea in 1992. However, as 
evidenced by Quit Claim Deed recorded November 15, 1999, in Book 445, Page 752, Ms. Lea 
reconveyed the interest back to Carbon County in 1999. Between 1992 and 1999, Ms. Lea was 
the apparent owner of record for her parcel. 
5. At one or more times between 1991 and 1995, and thereafter, Mr. Terry Olsen, 
Ms. Larue Layne, and other relatives of Ms. LaRue Layne, expressed or implied to RGC that 
LaRue Layne had authority to communicate with RGC on behalf of other family landowners in 
regard to RGC's offers to lease their interests or join the DW Unit. 
6. Beginning in late 1990 Ms. LaRue Layne was invited by RGC, both verbally and 
in writing, to join the DW Unit or to lease her and her family's mineral interests. In 1991, 
Petitioner's Landowners were invited by RGC in writing to join the federal DW Unit but either 
failed to respond or declined to accept. Subsequently, RGC sent certified letters dated July 20, 
1995, offering Petitioner's Landowners to either lease or commit their interests to the DW Unit 
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as working interest owners on the same terms as any other working interest owners in their 
respective positions. 
7. The bonus and other general terms and conditions of the written offers presented 
to Petitioner's Landowners by Respondent(s), to either lease their mineral interests or to join the 
federal Drunkards Wash Unit, were reasonable and in good faith. 
8. RGC's written and verbal communications with LaRue Layne, and its 
communications and attempted communications with Ms. LaRue Laynes' children and relatives, 
were reasonable and in good faith. 
9. Petitioner's Landowner(s) either failed to accept, or failed to respond to, the 
Respondent's July 20, 1995, offer to lease their interests or join the DW Unit. However, at no 
time did Respondents offer Petitioner's Landowners the opportunity to participate 
proportionately on an individual well basis for either well 5-94 or well 5-266. RGC relied in 
good faith on the responses, and lack or responses, from LaRue Layne and other members of her 
family. 
10. Beginning in 1990 and again in 1995, but prior to the drilling of unit well 5-94, 
Petitioner's Landowners knew or reasonably should have known of the following: their 
properties were located within the boundaries of a federal oil and gas unit; that oil and gas may 
be present under their property; that third parties, including the operators of the DW Unit 
believed some or all of the them had an ownership interest in the oil and gas under their property; 
and that two unit wells were planned to be drilled on or near their properties. 
11. RGC, as DW Unit Operator, commenced the drilling of the 5-94 well on Lot 4 
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(the NWI/4NW/4) of Section 5 on September 11, 1995, and completed it as a coalbed methane 
well in the Ferron formation on November 7, 1995. Subsequent to 1995, Petitioner's 
Landowners knew or reasonably should have known that unit well 5-94 was in fact drilled and 
was later operating as a production well, and that they had, or potentially had, an ownership 
interest in the methane gas being produced from that well. RGC, as DW Unit Operator, 
commenced the drilling of the 5-266 well on the SWV^NEVi of Section 5 on November 12, 1998, 
and completed it as a coalbed methane well in the Ferron formation on December 23, 1998. 
Subsequent to completion of the well 5-266 in 1998, Petitioner's Landowners knew or 
reasonably should have known that unit well 5-266 was operating as a production well, and that 
they potentially had an ownership interest in the methane gas being produced from that well. The 
locations of both wells were authorized by virtue of the Utah Division of Oil, Gas & Mining's 
(the "Division's") approval of applications for permit to drill and the Board's Order entered in 
Cause No. 243-2 on July 13, 1999. Both wells are located on leaseholds owned solely by 
Respondents. 
12. At the time the 5-94 and 5-266 wells were drilled the subject lands were subject 
only to the general well siting rule (Utah Admin. Code Rule R649-3-2), which was suspended by 
virtue of the Board's Order entered July 13, 1999, in Cause No. 243-2. The first order entered by 
the Board establishing spacing for coalbed methane produced from the Ferron formation in 
Carbon County was entered in Cause No. 241-1 on January 2, 1998. The first order entered by 
the Board establishing spacing for coalbed methane produced from the Ferron formation in areas 
directly adjacent to the DW Unit (and in response to a Request for Agency Action filed by RGC) 
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was entered October 13, 1998, in Cause No. 243-1. The captioned lands were not subject to any 
spacing order until entry of the Board's order in Cause No. 243-3 effective January 26, 2000. 
13. On June 21, 1999, Hegarty leased the mineral interests of Petitioner's 
Landowners. At that time he was aware the captioned lands were within the physical boundaries 
of the DW Unit, and of the existence of the 5-94 and 5-266 wells and RGC's operation of them. 
14. Petitioner Patrick Hegarty's interests and rights in this matter are derived from the 
landowners' mineral interests in the subject areas. 
15. At the time they were drilled, wells 5-94 and 5-266 were located near the edge of 
the known coalbed methane gas field, and for purposes of imposing a risk penalty under the facts 
of this matter, and for no other purpose, wells 5-94 and 5-266 constitute exploratory wells. At 
the time wells 5-94 and 5-266 were drilled, Respondents incurred a moderate amount of risk that 
these wells would not produce sufficient coalbed methane gas to become production wells. 
16. There is no unit, pooling, operating, or other similar agreement between Petitioner 
and the Landowners, and the Respondents. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Petitioner's mineral interests are derived from the uncommitted Petitioner's 
Landowners' mineral interests. 
2. For purposes of the issues presented in this matter, Petitioner stands in the shoes 
of the landowners from which his mineral interests are derived, and therefore, Petitioner's 
equitable and legal rights and obligations are both derived from, and limited by, the acts and 
omissions of Petitioner's Landowners. 
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3. Similarly, Carbon County's oil and gas rights and interests in this matter were 
derived from Ms. Lea's apparent ownership of the parcel between 1992 and 1999, and its rights 
and obligations are both derived from, and limited by, the acts and omissions of Ms. Lea. 
4. The Respondent operator made numerous written offers to the Landowners to 
lease their mineral interests or to join the federal Drunkard's Wash Unit. 
5. Until the Board's spacing order in Cause No. 243-3, effective January 26, 2000, 
was adopted, Petitioner's Landowners' interests did not reach to wells drilled off their property, 
and Respondents had no obligation to extend offers to participate in the costs and production of 
wells 5-94 and 5-266. 
6. However, assuming that prior to the effective date of the spacing order for wells 
5-94 and 5-266, Respondents had an affirmative obligation to offer to Petitioner's Landowner's 
an opportunity to participate in wells 5-94 and 5-266, the repeated written offers made by 
Respondent(s) beginning in 1991 to lease mineral interests or to join the federal DW Unit 
constitute good faith offers for purposes of Utah law requiring that good faith offers be made to a 
landowner before the landowner may be deemed to be "nonconsenting." 
7. Petitioner's Landowners repeatedly failed to accept or to respond to the good faith 
offers, and Petitioner's Landowners otherwise failed to take action to establish and protect their 
interests in the subsurface gas or the production from the 5-94 well and the 5-266 well. The 
Landowners' failure to respond to, or accept the offers, constitute a refusal and result in 
Petitioner's Landowners becoming nonconsenting owners. 
8. In the facts of this case, as between the unit operators and those landowners who 
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are on notice oil and gas wells are planned to be drilled near their property, the unit operator does 
not have a superior obligation to initiate a petition for a spacing order. 
9. In the absence of the Petitioner demonstrating that the Unit Operator wrongfully 
or fraudulently delayed requesting a spacing order or wrongfully delayed the spacing order 
procedure, the effective date of the pooling order shall be the date of the spacing order. 
10. Petitioner has failed to carry its burden of showing the Unit Operator wrongfully 
delayed petitioning for a spacing order, or wrongfully prolonged the spacing order hearing 
process. 
11. In the absence of a pooling or similar agreement between the Petitioner and 
Operators, Petitioner may petition the Board for a forced pooling agreement. 
12. The statutory terms of the forced pooling agreement allow the Board to impose on 
Petitioner and Petitioner's Landowners a "nonconsent penalty" of between 100% and 300% of 
the costs described at Utah Code Ann. 40-6-6.5(4)(d)(i)(D), to compensate consenting owners for 
the risks of drilling wells 5-94 and 5-266. 
13. Based upon what was known of the subsurface geology, the possibility the wells 
would not be productive, and the increased risks inherent in drilling for coalbed methane in 
general, a 225% nonconsent penalty is fair and reasonable. 
14. The 225% nonconsent penalty is also fair and reasonable when compared to the 
nonconsent penalty awarded by the Board in a comparable matter involving the same producing 
formations. 
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ORDER 
Based upon Petitioner's and Respondents' briefs, arguments, exhibits, testimony and 
evidence submitted, and the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth above, and good 
cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. The Board grants Petitioner's request for a forced pooling order. 
2. The Board denies Petitioner's request that the pooling order be retroactive to the 
date of first production for each of the Unit Wells. 
3. The effective date of the pooling order shall be the date of the spacing order, 
January 26, 2000. 
4. Denies both Petitioner's and Respondents' requested terms of the pooling order 
except to the extent those terms may agree with the pooling order terms described in this Order. 
5. In compliance with the statutory requirements for forced pooling order, the Board 
orders the general terms of the pooling agreement be as follows: 
All interests within Unit No. 1, are pooled for development and operation of such unit, 
and all interests within Unit No. 2, are pooled for development and operation of such units. 
Wells 5-94 and 5-266 are the unit wells for Unit No. 1 and No. 2 respectively. In compliance 
with Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-6.5 it is ordered: 
(a) That Hegarty, Petitioner's Landowners and Carbon County (as to the interest 
acquired from Michelle Lea) be deemed nonconsenting owners in the 5-94 and 
5-266 wells; 
(b) That RGC, TEXEP and DRU be deemed consenting owners in the 5-94 and 5-266 
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wells and reimbursed for Hegarty, Petitioner's Landowners and Carbon County's 
share of the costs out of production from the drilling unit attributable to their 
respective tracts; 
(c) That Hegarty and Petitioner's Landowners shall be entitled to receive, subject to 
royalty or similar obligations, the share of production from the 5-94 well 
applicable to this interest in to Unit No. 1, and the 5-266 well applicable to this 
interest in Unit No. 2,>and Carbon County shall be entitled to receive, subject to 
royalty or similar obligations, the share of production from the 5-266 well 
applicable to its interest in Unit No. 2, after the consenting parties have recovered 
from their respective share of production the following amounts: 
(A) 100% of the nonconsenting owners' share of the cost of surface equipment 
beyond the wellhead connections, including stock tanks, separators, 
treaters, pumping equipment, and piping; 
(B) 100% of the nonconsenting owners' share of the estimated costs to plug 
and abandon the well as determined by the Division staff; 
(C) 100% of the nonconsenting owners' share of the cost of operation of the 
well from the effective date of the order and continuing until the 
consenting owners have recovered all costs; and 
(D) 225%o of the nonconsenting owners' share of the costs of staking the 
location, wellsite preparation, rights-of-way, rigging up, drilling, 
reworking, recomputing, deepening or plugging back, testing, and 
completing, and the cost of equipment in the well to and including the 
wellhead connections. 
(d) That the consenting owners shall pay to the Petitioner's Landowners the royalty 
provided for in their leases with Hegarty (being 1/8), proportionately reduced in 
accordance with the pooling established by the Board; 
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(e) That the consenting owners shall pay to Carbon County a 1/8 royalty, 
proportionately reduced in accordance with the pooling established by the Board, 
in the 5-266 well and Unit No. 2, payable from its share of production until 
recovery of the amounts set forth in (d) above; 
(f) That the operator of the 5-94 and 5-266 wells shall furnish any nonconsenting 
owner with monthly statements specifying costs incurred, the quantity of gas 
produced, and the amount of gas proceeds realized from the sale of the production 
during the preceding month; 
{£> T\vat vrtvea. t t e cor^ttov% partes, \axt xw&v&l fayxv ^ w^^CQ^^to.g, WKVSX' s 
relinquished interest all of the amounts specified above, the relinquished interest 
shall automatically revert to the nonconsenting owner; 
(h) That RGC and TEXEP may release the suspended proceeds from the 5-94 and 
5-266 wells in accordance with the foregoing; 
6, Pursuant to the stipulated agreement of the Petitioner and Respondent, the Board 
orders that John Baza, Associate Director of the Utah Division of Oil, Gas & Mining, act as 
mediator to assist the parties to negotiate such additional terms and provisions as are necessary 
for continued operation of the spaced lands which are not inconsistent with the above-ordered 
terms and conditions. 
7. If the parties are unable to mediate additional, mutually acceptable, proposed 
terms of a pooling and operations agreement for each unit well for consideration by the Board, 
John Baza shall act as hearing examiner and recommend in writing to the Board within 120 days 
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of the date of this Order, those terms and conditions which he believes are just and reasonable, 
and otherwise in compliance with the law and the Board's regulations. The proposed additional 
terms shall address whether Petitioner shall be granted access to existing gas and water 
transportation facilities, and if so, just and reasonable terms for allowing such access. 
8. Pursuant to Utah Administrative Code R641 and R649-10-1 through R649-10-2.2, 
and Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b and § 40-6, the Board has considered and decided this matter as a 
formal adjudication. 
9. This Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order ("Order") is based 
exclusively on evidence of record in the adjudicative proceeding or on facts officially noted, and 
constitutes the signed written Order stating the Board's decision and the reasons for the decision, 
all as required by the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b and § 40-6-
10, and Utah Administrative Code R641-109. 
10. Notice of Right to Seek Judicial Review by the Utah Supreme Court or to Request 
Board Reconsideration: As required by Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-10(e) to -10(g), the Board 
hereby notifies all parties in interest that they have the right to seek judicial review of this final 
Board Order in this formal adjudication by filing a timely appeal with the Utah Supreme Court 
within 30 days after the date that this Order is issued. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(3)(a) and -
16. As an alternative to seeking immediate judicial review, and not as a prerequisite to seeking 
judicial review, the Board also hereby notifies parties that they may elect to request that the 
Board reconsider this Order, which constitutes a final agency action of the Board. Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-46b-13, entitled, "Agency Review - Reconsideration," states: 
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1. (a) Within 20 days after the date that an Order is issued for which review by 
the agency or by a superior agency under Section 63-46b-12 is 
unavailable, and if the Order would otherwise constitute final agency 
action, any party may file a written request for reconsideration with the 
agency, stating the specific grounds upon which relief is requested, 
(b) Unless otherwise provided by statute, the filing of the request is not a 
prerequisite for seeking judicial review of the Order. 
2. The request for reconsideration shall be filed with the agency and one copy shall 
be sent by mail to each party by the person making the request. 
3. (a) The agency head, or a person designated for that purpose, shall issue a 
written Order granting the request or denying the request, 
(b) If the agency head or the person designated for that purpose does not issue 
an Order within 20 days after the filing of the request, the request for 
reconsideration shall be considered to be denied. 
Id. The Board also hereby notifies the parties that Utah Administrative Code R641-110-
100, which is part of a group of Board rules entitled, "Rehearing and Modification of Existing 
Orders," states: 
Any person affected by a final Order or decision of the Board may file a petition for 
rehearing. Unless otherwise provided, a petition for rehearing must be filed no later than 
the 10th day of the month following the date of signing of the final Order or decision for 
which the rehearing is sought. A copy of such petition will be served on each party to the 
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proceeding no later than the 15th day of that month. 
]d. Sec Utah Administrative Code R641-110-200 for the required contents of a Petition 
for Rehearing. If there is any conflict between the deadline in Utah Code Ann § 63-46b-13 and 
the deadline in Utah Administrative Code R641-110-100 for moving to rehear this matter, the 
Board hereby rules that the later of the two deadlines shall be available to any party moving to 
rehear this matter. If the Board later denies a timely petition for rehearing, the party may still 
seek judicial review of the Order by perfecting a timely appeal with the Utah Supreme Court 
within 30 days thereafter. 
11. The Board retains continuing jurisdiction over all the parties and over the subject 
matter of this Cause, except to the extent said jurisdiction may be divested by the filing of a 
timely appeal to seek judicial review of this Order by the Utah Supreme Court. 
12. For all purposes, the Chairman's signature on a faxed copy of this Order shall be 
deemed the equivalent of a signed original 
ISSUED this T~ day of October, 2000. 
STATE OF UTAH 
BOARD OF OIL, GAS & MINING 
Dave D. Lauriski, Chairman 
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proceeding no later than the 15th day of that month. 
Id. See Utah Administrative Code R641-110-200 for the required contents of a Petition 
for Rehearing. If there is any conflict between the deadline in Utah Code Ann § 63-46b-13 and 
the deadline in Utah Administrative Code R641-110-100 for moving to rehear this matter, the 
Board hereby rules that the later of the two deadlines shall be available to any party moving to 
rehear this matter. If the Board later denies a timely petition for rehearing, the party may still 
seek judicial review of the Order by perfecting a timely appeal with the Utah Supreme Court 
within 30 days thereafter. 
11. The Board retains continuing jurisdiction over all the parties and over the subject 
matter of this Cause, except to the extent said jurisdiction may be divested by the filing of a 
timely appeal to seek judicial review of this Order by the Utah Supreme Court. 
12. For all purposes, the Chairman's signature on a faxed copy of this Order shall be 
deemed the equivalent of a signed original. 
ISSUED this day of October, 2000. 
STATE OF UTAH 
BOARD OF OIL, GAS & MINING 
By 
Dave D. Lauriski, Chairman 
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P.O. Box 756 
Price, UT 84501 
Dominion-Reserves-Utah, Inc. 
901 East Byrd Street 
P.O. Box 26532 
Richmond, VA 23219 
Utah School and Institutional 
Trust Lands Administration 
675 East 500 South, #500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
Intermountain Electronics, Inc. 
P.O. Box 914 
Price, UT 84501 
Michelle Lea 
754 Ramona Avenue 
Salt Lake City, UT 84105-3144 
Five Star Enterprises, Inc. 
P.O. Box 488 
Price, UT 84501 
LaRue Layne, Teri Layne 
& Kelly Layne-Benning 
17243 Knapp Street 
Northridge, CA 91325 
Terry T. Olsen, Trustee under Trust Agrs. 
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Supreme Court of Utah. 
Callie COWLING, Marie Grubbs, Marguerite 
Wilson, Robert Baird, Ed Baird, Jr., 
and The Adra Baird Estate, through its Co-
Executors, Ed Baird, Jr., and Robert 
Baird, Plaintiffs and Appellees, 
v. 
The BOARD OF OIL, GAS AND MINING, 
DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES 
FOR the STATE 
OF UTAH, and Celsius Energy Company, a 
Nevada corporation, Defendants and 
Appellants. 
No. 860518. 
Dec. 31, 1991. 
Rehearing Denied March 31,1992. 
Appeal was taken from order of the District Court, Salt 
Lake County, Leonard H. Russon, J., ruling that the 
Board of Oil, Gas and Mining erred in making pooling 
order for oil and gas well retroactive to date of first 
production. The Supreme Court, Stewart, J., held that 
Board of Oil, Gas and Mining erred in ruling that 
pooling order for gas well was required to be made 
retroactive to date of first production, rather than to 
date of entry of spacing order, absent inequitable 
conduct on part of landowners. 
Affirmed. 
West Headnotes 
[1J Administrative Law and Procedure <®^681.1 
15Ak681.1 
(Formerly 15 Ak681) 
When lower court reviews order of administrative 
agency and Supreme Court exercises appellate review 
of lower court's judgment. Supreme Court acts as if it 
were reviewing administrative agency decision directly. 
[2] Mines and Minerals <®^>47 
260k47 
Under law of capture, landowner incurred no liability 
for causing oil or gas to migrate across property 
boundaries and was not required to compensate 
adjoining landowners for draining oil and gas from 
their lands. 
[3] Mines and Minerals <@^47 
260k47 
While the Utah Oil and Gas Conservation Act modifies 
law of capture, it does not wholly displace that law; in 
essence, Act establishes regulatory scheme that 
protects correlative rights, while also continuing law of 
capture to limited extent. U.C.A.1953,40-6-1 et seq. 
[4] Mines and Minerals <@^47 
260k47 
Before spacing order is entered, "correlative right" is 
right to undifferentiated and unquantifiable interest in 
oil or gas pool beneath one's land. U.C.A.1953,40-6-1 
et seq. 
[5] Mines and Minerals <®=>92.23(1) 
260k92.23(l) 
(Formerly 260k92.23) 
Under the Oil and Gas Conservation Act, it is not 
possible to ascertain a landowner's correlative rights 
until the Board of Oil, Gas and Mining acquires the 
necessary data in formal hearing, makes findings of 
feet, and enters spacing and drilling unit order. 
U.C.A.1953,40-6-1 et seq. 
[6] Mines and Minerals <®=>47 
260k47 
[6] Mines and Minerals <®=^92.79 
260k92.79 
(Formerly 260k92.78) 
Voluntary pooling agreements and forced pooling 
orders are mechanisms used to enforce correlative 
rights. U.C.A.1953,40-6-6(5). 
[7J Mines and Minerals <©^92.79 
260k92.79 
(Formerly 260k92.78) 
Pooling order must be based on existence of drilling 
unit. U.C.A.1953,40-6-6(5). 
[8J Mines and Minerals <@=>92.80 
260k92.80 
Under forced pooling order, nonconsenting working 
interest owner's share of drilling costs is deducted from 
that owner's share of production; payout must be 
achieved before owner is entitled to share in 
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production. U.C.A. 1953,40-6-6(6). 
[9| Mines and Minerals <®=>92.80 
260k92.80 
Nonconsenting working interest owners are subject to 
penalties ranging from 150% to 200% of cost of 
drilling well in unit in order to compensate working 
interest owners for assuming risks of not receiving their 
investment and for their upfront payment of drilling 
costs. U.C.A.1953, 40-6-6(5, 6). 
[10] Mines and Minerals <@ =^>92.79 
260k92.79 
Because Oil and Gas Conservation Act authorizes 
pooling orders to be entered only with respect to 
established drilling units and because pooling order 
that pools working interest must take into account costs 
of drilling, by implication statutory scheme 
contemplates that pooling orders shall be retroactive to 
date of first production, but only if spacing order was 
then in effect. U.C.A.1953,40-6-6(5, 6). 
[11] Mines and Minerals <®=*92.79 
260k92.79 
(Formerly 260k92.78) 
Even though statewide well-location rule prohibits 
drilling at certain locations, it does not establish basis 
for defining legal interests in a pool. U.C.A.1953, 
40-6-1 et seq. 
[12] Mines and Minerals <®=>92.23(1) 
260k92.23(l) 
(Formerly 260k92.23) 
Owner's failure to take action to establish and protect 
his or her interest in production prior to entry of 
spacing order constitutes waiver of that interest until 
drilling unit is established. 
[13] Mines and Minerals <®=^92.79 
260k92.79 
If operator of well engages in inequitable conduct by 
wrongfully delaying application for spacing order, 
thereby prejudicing another's correlative right, Board of 
Oil, Gas and Mining may make appropriate 
adjustments as to date pooling order is effective; that 
is, pooling order may be made effective prior to entry 
of spacing order to offset any inequitable delay by 
operator in pursuing petition for spacing order. 
U.C.A.1953, 40-6-6(5). 
[14] Mines and Minerals <@^92.79 
260k92.79 
Board of Oil, Gas and Mining erred in ruling that 
pooling order for gas well was required to be made 
retroactive to date of first production, rather than to 
date of entry of spacing order, absent inequitable 
conduct on part of landowners. U.C.A.1953,40-6-6(5) 
[15] Mines and Minerals <§^92J9 
260k92.79 
With respect to wildcat or exploratory wells, where no 
preexisting field-wide spacing order has been entered, 
pooling order should be effective no earlier than date of 
spacing order, unless there are special circumstances 
which would make it just and equitable for order to be 
retroactive to protect correlative rights established by 
the Oil and Gas Conservation Act from inequitable or 
overreaching conduct. U.C.A.1953, 40-6-1 etseq. 
[16] Mines and Minerals <§^92.79 
260k92.79 
If operator of successful wildcat well wrongfully delays 
petitioning for a spacing order or wrongfully prolongs 
hearing process, Board of Oil, Gas and Mining may 
make a pooling order retroactive to date of application 
for spacing order, or possibly to prior time. 
U.C.A.1953, 40-6-1 etseq. 
*221 Donald S. Coleman, Mark C. Moench, and 
David L. Wilkinson, Salt Lake City, for Bd. of Oil, Gas 
&Min. 
Phillip Lear, Alan Sullivan, and Ruland J. Gill, Salt 
Lake City, for Celsius Energy. 
Rosemary Beless, Albert J. Colton, and Anthony L. 
Rampton, Salt Lake City, for Robert and Ed Baird, 
Marguerite Wilson, Callie Cowling, and Estate of Adra 
Baird. 
STEWART, Justice: 
Celsius Energy Company is a working interest owner 
and the operator of the Ucolo No. 2 well, which was 
drilled on property leased from Adra Baird and, after 
her death, from her heirs. Adra Baird executed three 
leases conveying the mineral interests in her 110.14 
acres to Celsius. [FN1] The Baird property is located 
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in the north half of section 10 in a township of San Juan 
*222 County, Utah. Celsius completed the well in the 
Desert Creek zone on April 19, 1983, but the well was 
not connected to a production pipeline until November 
1983. Also on April 19, 1983, Celsius executed a 
voluntary declaration of pooling pursuant to the three 
Baird leases covering the 110.14- acre Baird tract. 
The leases entitled the Bairds to a 1/6 royalty. 
FN I. An entity named K.OGO also owns part 
of the working interest and operating rights. 
Celsius paid 100 percent of landowner's royalties from 
the time of first production until the entry of the Board's 
pooling order to Adra Baird and, after her death, to her 
heirs (plaintiffs in the court below and hereinafter 
collectively referred to as "the Bairds"). Celsius also 
had an oil and gas lease covering a federally owned 
tract which constituted the remainder of the north half 
of section 10 and adjoined the Baird tracts. Since 
Ucolo No. 2 was the discovery well of the pool it 
drained, there was no spacing order in effect when the 
well was completed. In 1983, Celsius petitioned the 
Board of Oil, Gas and Mining ("the Board") for a 
spacing order. Celsius preliminarily indicated that the 
area drained by Ucolo No. 2 might include part of the 
federal tract, in addition to the Baird tracts. However, 
since Celsius had not acquired sufficient data to show 
the actual area drained, the initial proceeding for a 
spacing order was dismissed. 
In early January 1985, Celsius again applied to the 
Board for a single-well spacing and drilling unit order 
for the gas pool drained by Ucolo No. 2. After the 
Board held evidentiary hearings, the parties agreed to 
the size and configuration of the pool. On March 28, 
1985, the Board issued findings of fact, conclusions of 
law, and a spacing and pooling order based on the 
evidence adduced and the parties' stipulation. 
The Board found that Ucolo No. 2 drained a 
300.14-acre area, of which the Baird heirs owned 
110.14 acres and the Bureau of Land Management (the 
"BLM") owned 190 acres. On June 24, 1985, 
pursuant to a stipulation by the Bairds, Celsius, and the 
BLM, the Board modified its prior findings and order, 
finding that the area drained by the well was 200.14 
acres, 110.14 acres of which were owned by the Bairds 
and 90 acres by the BLM. That order required a 
pooling of the Bairds' and the BLM's interests in the 
200.14-acre drilling unit. Over the dissent of two 
Board members, the Board made the pooling order 
retroactive to the first day of the first month of 
production, April 1, 1983. The Board also found that 
Celsius had paid the Bairds $230,000 in royalties from 
the time of first production to the date of the Board's 
pooling order and ruled that the BLM was entitled to a 
share of those royalties based on the BLM's percentage 
of land in the drilling unit drained by Ucolo No. 2. 
The Bairds appealed the Board's ruling that the 
pooling order should be retroactive to the date of first 
production to the district court. They argued that the 
Board's order deprived them of a vested right to all the 
royalties from Ucolo No. 2 from first production until 
entry of the spacing and pooling order. The district 
court ruled that the Board erred in making the pooling 
order retroactive and that the pooling order should have 
been made effective as of the time the spacing order 
was entered. The district court reasoned that the BLM 
could have protected its interest in the gas drained from 
its acreage in the north half of section 10 in one of two 
ways. First, the BLM might have petitioned the Board 
for an exception to Board Rule C-3(b), a statewide well 
location rule, and drilled its own well. Second, the 
BLM could have petitioned for a spacing and a pooling 
order at an earlier time than Celsius did. 
Celsius and the Board appealed from the district court 
order to this Court. The BLM has not joined in the 
appeal. Celsius argues three interrelated points in 
support of its position that the pooling order should be 
retroactive to the date of first production. First, 
Celsius argues that this case is governed by Bennion v. 
Utah State Bd. of Oil, Gas & Mining, 675 P.2d 1135 
(Utah 1983), which held that the Board did not err in 
making a pooling order retroactive to the date of first 
production to protect an adjoining landowner's 
correlative rights. Second, Celsius argues that because 
the statewide well location rule, Rule C-3(b), 
prohibited the BLM, as an adjoining landowner, *223 
from drilling a well on its own tract in section 10, the 
pooling order had to be retroactive to the date of first 
production to protect the BLM's correlative rights. 
That rule, Celsius argues, in effect nullified the right of 
the BLM to protect the BLM's rights under the law of 
capture by prohibiting it from drilling on its own land. 
Third, Celsius relies on the authority of Farmer's 
Irrigation District v. Schumacher, 187 Neb. 825, 194 
N.W.2d 788 (1972), for the proposition that the 
pooling order must be retroactive in order to protect the 
correlative rights of the United States. 
The Bairds' position is that correlative rights in oil and 
gas are dependent on the provisions of the Utah Oil and 
Gas Conservation Act and are defined by spacing 
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orders. Specifically, the Bairds assert that until the 
Board enters a spacing order, the correlative rights of 
adjoining interest owners are neither defined nor 
definable with any particularity. Since the spacing and 
pooling orders in this case were entered at the same 
time, the pooling order could not be retroactive to first 
production because the BLM had no specifically 
defined correlative right prior to entry of the spacing 
order. The Bairds argue that Bennion is 
distinguishable because first production in that case 
occurred after entry of the spacing order. Therefore, 
the pooling order in Bennion was properly retroactive 
to the date of first production. They also assert that the 
statewide well location rule does not wholly displace 
the law of capture, but rather, that their interest in all 
the landowner's royalties was protected up to the time 
of first production by the law of capture. 
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[1] We turn first to the standard of review to be 
applied to the decision of a lower court reviewing an 
order of an administrative agency. When a lower court 
reviews an order of an administrative agency and we 
exercise appellate review of the lower court's judgment, 
we act as if we were reviewing the administrative 
agency decision directly. Bennion v. Utah State Bd. of 
Oil, Gas & Mining Co., 675 P.2d 1135, 1139 (Utah 
1983). We do not defer, or accord a presumption of 
correctness, to the lower court's decision, since that 
court's review of the administrative record is no more 
advantaged than ours. 
The Board and Celsius argue that this Court should 
defer to the Board's ruling on the ground that the issue 
before the Board was a mixed question of fact and law. 
Specifically, they assert that the issue is whether it was 
"just and reasonable" within the meaning of Utah Code 
Ann. § 40-6-6(5) for the Board to make the pooling 
order retroactive to first production to protect the 
BLM's correlative rights. They also assert that the 
Board acted reasonably and within its discretion and 
that this Court must therefore defer to the Board's 
ruling. The Bairds, on the other hand, contend that the 
central issue is when did the BLM's correlative rights 
come into existence under the provisions of the Utah 
Oil and Gas Conservation Act. That issue, the Bairds 
argue, is an issue of law. 
In 1985, after Bennion was decided, the Legislature 
amended the Oil and Gas Conservation Act. Utah 
Code Ann. § 40-6-12(1) (Supp. 1985) established the 
scope of judicial review of Board orders. [FN2] That 
section provides in part: 
FN2. The Legislature has since adopted the 
Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA), 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-l to -22 (1989 & 
Supp. 1991), which establishes uniform 
standards for judicial review of administrative 
agency actions. Section 63-46b-22(2) of the 
Act states that all agency adjudicative 
proceedings commenced "on or before 
December 31, 1987" are governed by 
"[statutes and rules governing agency action, 
agency review, and judicial review ... in effect 
on December 31, 1987...." Because the action 
in this case was commenced before December 
31, 1987, the provisions of the Oil and Gas 
Conservation Act control. Nevertheless, the 
outcome would be the same under UAPA. 
An appeal from a rule or order of the board, except 
appeals from orders issued under Section 40-6-9, 
shall be a trial on the record and not be considered 
a trial de novo. The Court shall set aside the board 
action if it is found to be: 
(a) Unreasonable, unjust, arbitrary, capricious, or 
an ?buse of discretion; 
*224 Osr) Contrary to constitutional right, power, 
privilege, or immunity; 
(c) In excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or 
limitations; 
(d) Not in compliance with procedure required by 
law; 
(e) Based upon a clearly erroneous interpretation or 
application of the law; or 
(f) As to an adjudicative proceeding, unsupported 
by substantial evidence on the record. 
Both the Bairds and Celsius argue, somewhat off-
handedly, that their conflicting claims to the pre-
pooling order royalties are based on a constitutional 
right to a vested property interest. The Bairds assert 
that their property right arises under the law of capture, 
while Celsius contends that the BLM's right is based on 
the law of correlative rights. These positions invoke 
subparagraph (b) of § 40-6-12(1), which would require 
the application of correction-of-error standard. 
The parties' positions, however, are really rooted in 
issues of statutory construction. The issue of where 
the law of capture ends and the law of correlative rights 
begins, at least with respect to compulsory pooling 
orders, is a question of state statutory law, not 
constitutional law. We do not, therefore, decide this 
issue under subparagraph (b), but rather under 
subparagraph (c). The issues that arise under that 
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provision are issues of law, and we therefore accord no 
deference to the Board's resolution. 
Although we recognize that in Bennion we deferred to 
the Board's ruling holding a pooling order retroactive to 
the time of first production, first production in that case 
occurred after the entry of a spacing order. For reasons 
that appear below, that fact is critical and, in essence, 
changes the nature of the issue before the Court. 
n. CORRELATIVE RIGHTS 
[2] The law of capture applies in all jurisdictions until 
modified by state law. 1 Williams & Meyers, Oil and 
Gas Law § 204.4 (1986). Under the common law of 
capture, a landowner could drill for oil or gas on its 
land wherever and with as many wells as the landowner 
thought appropriate. If oil or gas were found, the 
landowner would not be liable to adjacent landowners 
whose lands were also drained, even if the producing 
well were drilled next to the adjoining landowner's 
boundary. Moreover, the producing landowner would 
be entitled to produce as much oil or gas as possible, 
even though the ultimate recovery of oil or gas from the 
reservoir was diminished. Thus, under the law of 
capture, a landowner incurred no liability for causing 
oil or gas to migrate across property boundaries and 
was not required to compensate adjoining landowners 
for draining oil and gas from their lands. Thompson v. 
Consolidated Gas Utilities Corp., 300 U.S. 55, 68, 57 
S.Ct. 364, 370, 81 L.Ed. 510 (1937); Champlin 
Refining Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 286 U.S. 210, 
233, 52 S.Ct. 559, 564, 76 L.Ed. 1062 (1932); Brown 
v. Spilman, 155 U.S. 665, 669-70, 15 S.Ct. 245, 
246-47, 39 L.Ed. 304 (1895); 1 William & Meyers, 
Oil and Gas Law § 204.4, at 55-57 (1986). 
We described the consequences of the law of capture 
on early drilling and production practices in Bennion v. 
Utah State Bd of Oil Gas & Mining, 675 P.2d, 1135, 
1137 (Utah 1983): 
This rule of law produced results that were unfair 
to many landowners and development practices that 
were uneconomical or wasteful for all. Thus, it 
encouraged the drilling of more wells than 
necessary to drain a field, and it permitted 
techniques and rates of production that augmented 
the profits of the property owner whose land was 
producing, but wasted the resources of the field as 
a whole. Allen, "An Argument for Enforced Unit 
Development of Oil and Gas Reservoirs in Utah," 7 
UtahL.Rev. 197(1960). Legislative remedies 
were required. 
In 1955, the Legislature enacted the Utah Oil and Gas 
Conservation Act. That Act modified the law of 
capture and established the Utah Board of Oil, Gas and 
Mining to regulate the development and production of 
oil and gas in the state for the (^225/purpose of 
preventing waste and protecting correlative rights. The 
Act was amended and superseded by the Utah Oil and 
Gas Conservation Act of 1983. See Utah's Oil & Gas 
Conservation Act of1983. 5 J. Energy L. & Pol'y 49 
(1984). The 1983 Act was intended to promote the 
following purposes, among others: the development of 
oil and gas in a manner that would (1) prevent waste; 
(2) provide for the development and operation of oil 
and gas properties so as to maximize ultimate recovery; 
and (3) protect the "correlative rights of all owners." 
Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-1 (Supp. 1983). These 
objectives are significantly interrelated. 
[3] To achieve these ends, the Act authorizes the 
Board to limit a landowner's right to drill as many wells 
and in whatever locations on its land as the landowner 
chooses. Although the Act modifies the law of 
capture, it does not wholly displace that law, contrary 
to the position of the Board and Celsius. See generally 
Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Blankenship, 85 F.2d 553, 
555 (5th Cir.1936); Desormeaux v. Inexco Oil Co., 
298 So.2d 897 (La.Ct.App.), writ refused, 302 So.2d 
37 (1974). In essence, the Act establishes a regulatory 
scheme that protects correlative rights, while also 
continuing the law of capture to a limited extent. See 
generally Carter Oil Co. v. State, 205 Okl. 541, 240 
P.2d 787, 790 (1951). 
The Legislature initially defined correlative rights as 
"the owners' or producers'just and equitable share in a 
pool." Utah Code Ann. § 40-6- 4(j) (Supp.1955). In 
the 1983 Act, however, the Legislature amended that 
definition to mean the "opportunity of each owner in a 
pool to produce his just and equitable share of the oil 
and gas in a pool without waste." Utah Code Ann. § 
40-6-2(2) (1988). By defining correlative rights to be 
a "just and equitable share" in a pool, the statute makes 
individual correlative rights dependent upon the 
overriding objective of obtaining the greatest 
production possible from the pool, and not from any 
particular well or property. The definition of 
correlative rights does not, therefore, give a mineral 
interest owner an absolute right to all the oil or gas 
under one's land. Moreover, the term "without waste" 
is crucial because it imposes a duty upon the Board to 
ensure maximum recovery of the resource. See 
generally Ohmart v. Dennis, 188 Neb. 260, 196 
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[4] In essence, a landowner's correlative right is a 
unique property right. Before a spacing order is 
entered, a correlative right is a right to an 
undifferentiated and unquantifiable interest in an oil or 
gas pool beneath one's land. The right initially is 
nothing more than an "opportunity" to produce a "just 
and equitable share" of oil and gas "without waste." 
The mechanism for defining correlative rights in a pool 
of oil or gas is a spacing order, which establishes field-
wide drilling units. Section 40-6- 6(1) authorizes the 
Board to establish drilling units covering "any pool" of 
oil or gas. The order establishing the drilling units 
must "cover all lands ... underlaid by the pool." § 
40-6-6(3). All drilling units "shall be of uniform size 
and shape for the entire pool unless the board finds that 
it must make an exception due to geologic or 
geographic or other factors." Id. The order must 
specify "the acreage to be embraced within each 
drilling unit... but the unit shall not be smaller than the 
maximum area that can be efficiently and economically 
drained by one well." § 40-6-6( 1 )(a). Only one well 
may be drilled "from the common source of supply on 
any drilling unit." § 40-6-6(1 )(b). The Board may 
modify its original order on the basis of additional 
evidence "to include additional areas determined to be 
underlaid by the pool." §40-6-6(3). Once the Board 
fixes the size of the drilling units in a field, "the drilling 
of any well into the pool at a location other than 
authorized by the order is prohibited." § 40-6-6(4). 
The Board's determination of the size of the drilling 
units in a field is necessarily a discretionary 
determination based on the acreage that wells in the 
field can efficiently drain so as to maximize production 
from the pool as a whole and minimize the waste of oil 
and gas. See §40-6-6(1). The determination *226 
must, however, be based on geologic and reservoir 
engineering evidence pertaining to a number of factors, 
including; the reservoir's physical characteristics, such 
as the strength and nature of the pressures within the 
reservoir and the size and type of the producing 
formation; the porosity and permeability of the sands 
in which the hydrocarbons are trapped and through 
which they must move; available technology, including 
methods and resources for secondary and tertiary 
recovery; and, far from least, economic considerations 
such as the market price of oil and gas and extraction 
costs. It is, however, impossible to extract all the oil 
and gas from a pool, even with secondary and tertiary 
enhanced recovery techniques. 
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When a successful exploratory well is initially drilled, 
it is ordinarily impossible to determine with any degree 
of precision what area the well drains or the 
characteristics and extent of the pool. After the initial 
discovery is made, however, geologic and reservoir 
engineering data can be developed which enable the 
Board to fix the size of the drilling units needed to drain 
the reservoir efficiently. Landowners' correlative 
rights are then definable based on each landowner's 
fractional share of the total surface ownership within a 
particular drilling unit. See §40-6-6(6). Of course, 
not all the wells will produce equal volumes of oil or 
gas. Thus, the actual value of an interest owner's 
interest in a particular drilling unit will vary depending 
on the productivity of the well. Accordingly, a 
fractional interest in one drilling unit may have greater 
value than the same fractional interest in another 
drilling unit in the same field. 
[5] In short, under the Act, it is not possible to 
ascertain a landowners' correlative rights until the 
Board acquires the necessary data in a formal hearing, 
makes findings of fact, and enters a spacing and drilling 
unit order. 
The following example illustrates the relative nature of 
landowners' correlative rights on the Board's judgment 
in determining the size of drilling units in a field. If the 
Board fixes 160 acres as the size of a drilling unit, the 
correlative rights of adjoining landowners in such a unit 
will be different than if the unit is fixed at 80 acres. A 
reduction of a drilling unit from 160 acres to 80 acres 
could increase or decrease a landowner's share in the 
unit. Indeed, the Board in this case modified the size of 
the drilling unit after additional evidence was adduced, 
from 300.14 acres to 200.14 acres, thereby decreasing 
the BLM's correlative rights. 
[6][7][8][9][10] Voluntary pooling agreements and 
forced pooling orders are the mechanisms used to 
enforce correlative rights. [FN3] Pooling orders are 
based on each landowner's fractional share of surface 
ownership in a drilling unit. See § 40-6-6(5), (6). A 
pooling order must, therefore, be based on the 
existence of a drilling unit. [FN4] See *221 generally, 
6 Williams & Meyers, Oil and Gas Law § 905.2 
(1986). Indeed, § 40-6-6(6) of the Act contemplates 
that a pooling order shall be made with respect to a 
particular drilling unit. That section states in part: 
FN3. Utah Code Ana § 40-6-6(5) provides: 
Two or more owners within a drilling unit may 
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pool their interests for the development and 
operation of the unit. In the absence of 
voluntary pooling, the board may enter an 
order pooling all interests in the drilling unit for 
the development and operation. The order 
shall be made upon terms and conditions that 
are just and reasonable. Operations incident to 
the drilling of a well upon any portion of a unit 
covered by a pooling order shall be deemed 
for all purposes to be the conduct of the 
operations upon each separately owned tract in 
the unit by the several owners. That portion 
of the production allocated or applicable to 
each tract included in a unit covered by a 
pooling order shall, when produced, be 
deemed for all purposes to have been 
produced from each tract by a well drilled 
thereon. 
FN4. A working interest owner who does not 
enter into a voluntary pooling order with an 
operator incurs no out-of-pocket costs of 
drilling, no risk of a dry hole, and even if there 
is some production, no risk that the cost of 
drilling will exceed production proceeds. 
Therefore, under a forced pooling order, a 
nonconsenting working interest owner's share 
of drilling costs is deducted from that owner's 
share of production. Payout must be achieved 
before the owner is entitled to share in the 
production. Bennion v. Utah State Bd. of Oil, 
Gas & Mining, 675 P.2d 1135 (Utah 1983); 
Utah Code Ana § 40-6-6(6), (7). 
Nonconsenting owners are also subject to 
penalties ranging from 150% to 200% of 
the cost of drilling a well in the unit in 
order to compensate the working interest 
owners for assuming the risks of not 
recovering their investment and for their 
up- front payment of the drilling costs. 
Cf. In re SAM Oil, 817 P.2d 299 (Utah 
1991). 
Each pooling order shall permit the drilling and 
operation of a well on the drilling unit by any 
owner within the drilling unit, and shall provide for 
the payment of the costs, including a reasonable 
charge for supervision and storage facilities, as 
provided in this subsection. 
Because § 40-6-6(5) authorizes pooling orders to be 
entered only with respect to established drilling units 
and because a pooling order that pools working 
interests must take into account the costs of drilling, by 
implication the statutory scheme contemplates that 
pooling orders shall be retroactive to the date of first 
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production, see Bennion, 675 P.2d at 1142, but only if 
a spacing order was then in effect. 
Although a pooling order theoretically could be made 
retroactive to the date of first production from an 
exploratory or wildcat well, even though that date is 
prior to the entry of a spacing order, the Act does not 
contemplate that result. Retroactivity of a pooling 
order under those circumstances would give adjoining 
interest owners correlative rights before those rights 
are definable. This view is supported by cases from 
other jurisdictions. For example, Oklahoma courts 
have held that a pooling order may not be retroactive to 
a date prior to a spacing order, because it is a spacing 
order that establishes and defines correlative rights and 
abrogates the law of capture. Ward v. Corporation 
Comm'n, 501 P.2d 503 (Okla.1972); Wood Oil Co. v. 
Corporation Comm'n, 205 Okl. 537, 239 P.2d 1023 
(1950); Barton v. Cleary Petroleum Corp., 566 P.2d 
462 (Okla.Ct.App.1977). Significantly, Oklahoma, 
like Utah, places great importance on the protection of 
correlative rights. See Kingwood Oil Co. v. 
Corporation Comm'n, 396 P.2d 1008 (Okla.1964). 
The law in other jurisdictions also holds that pooling 
orders may not be retroactive to a time prior to the 
entry of a spacing order, in some cases on 
constitutional grounds because it would impair rights 
that vested under the law of capture. See, e.g., Pierce 
v. Goldking Properties, Inc., 396 So.2d 528 
(La.Ct.App. 1981); Desormeauxv. Inexco Oil Co., 
298 So.2d 897 (La.Ct.App. 1974); Buttes Resources 
Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 732 S.W.2d 675 
(Tex.Ct.App. 1987); Ward v. Corporation Comm'n, 
501 P.2d 503 (Okla. 1972). See also Mitchell v. 
Simpson, 493 P.2d 399 (Wyo.1972); 5 Eugene Kuntz, 
Oil and Gas § 77.3, at 398-99 (1978). 
Although courts in North Dakota and Nebraska have 
sustained pooling orders that were retroactive to a date 
prior to the entry of a spacing order, those cases are 
distinguishable. In Texaco Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 
448 N.W.2d 621 (N.D.I989), the court held that a 
pooling order should be retroactive to first production 
from a wildcat well because of a statute unlike Utah's 
that established a procedure for and required the entry 
of a temporary spacing order within thirty days of 
completion of such a well. The court stated that if a 
wildcat well "is drilled on land not covered by a 
spacing order, the Commission must docket a spacing 
hearing within thirty days and thereafter issue a 
temporary spacing order." Id. at 623. 
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Nebraska also allows a pooling order to be retroactive 
to a date prior to the entry of a spacing order, but only 
to remedy inequitable conduct by the operator of a well. 
In In Re Farmers Irrigation Dist., 187 Neb. 825, 194 
N.W.2d 788 (1972), a case Celsius relies on, the court 
recognized the inequity that can be caused by a 
retroactive pooling order because such an order would 
permit an "adjoining owner to sit back and await the 
successful outcome of drilling operations without 
asking for a pooling agreement...." Id. 194 N.W.2d at 
792. Nevertheless, the coun sustained a pooling order 
that was retroactive to first production, because of the 
well operator's "obvious delaying tactics." Id. at 792. 
We do not disagree in principle with that result, but as 
stated below, there were no obvious delaying tactics in 
this case. 
*228 Contrary to appellants' contention, Bennion v. 
Utah State Bd. of Oil, Gas & Mining, 675 P.2d 1135 
(Utah 1983), does not require the pooling order in this 
case to be retroactive to first production. In Bennion, 
the Board had issued field-wide spacing orders for the 
Bluebell, Altamont, and Cedar Rim-Sink Draw Fields 
in 1971 and 1972. A producing well was completed 
July 7, 1974, in an area covered by a spacing order. 
Although Bennion sustained an adjoining working 
interest owner's rights in first production, the entry of 
the spacing order preceded the date of first production. 
Bennion simply did not address the precise question 
whether a pooling order could be retroactive to first 
production when made prior to the entry of a spacing 
order. 
Celsius argues that the rationale in Bennion controls. 
The Bennion Court justified the retroactivity of the 
pooling order on the ground that the spacing order 
prohibited an adjoining interest owner within the 
drilling unit from drilling on his or her own land. 
Celsius asserts that here, the statewide well-location 
rule, Rule C-3(b), prevented the BLM from drilling on 
that part of its tract located in section 10 and that 
therefore the BLM was entitled to a pooling order 
retroactive to the date of first production. There is, 
however, a significant difference between a spacing 
order and Rule C- 3(b). 
Rule C-3(b) prohibits the location of wells within 
certain distances of boundary lines and other wells. Its 
purposes include the prevention of waste by avoiding 
unnecessary dissipation of reservoir pressures before a 
spacing order specifically tailored to a field can be 
entered. That purpose justifies a limitation on well 
locations before a spacing order is entered. The minor 
restriction of a landowner's right to drill under the law 
of capture does not mean, however, that the law of 
correlative rights attaches. 
[11] Thus, Rule C-3(b) does not wholly nullify the law 
of capture. As long as the narrow limitations of that 
rule are not violated, a well may be drilled anywhere. 
Even though the rule prohibits drilling at certain 
locations, it does not establish a basis for defining legal 
interests in a pool. In Carter Oil Co. v. State, 205 
Okl. 541,240 P.2d 787 (1951), the Oklahoma 
Supreme Court addressed the effect of a similar rule 
governing the general location of wells outside areas 
covered by field spacing orders. The Court stated: 
"We cannot subscribe to the contention presented that 
the effect of the Commission rule 202 establishes the 
acreage as a well-spacing and drilling unit. That rule 
simply establishes the location of a drilling site and no 
more." Id. 240 P.2d at 794. 
[12] Moreover, Rule C-3(e) expressly allows an 
adjoining interest owner to petition the Board for an 
exception location. An adjoining mineral estate owner 
who is prevented from drilling a well may also seek to 
enter into a voluntary pooling agreement to protect that 
interest. See Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-6(5). An 
owner's failure to take action to establish and protect 
his or her interest in production prior to the entry of a 
spacing order constitutes a waiver of that interest until 
a drilling unit is established. See Ohio Oil Co. v. 
Indiana, 177 U.S. 190, 20 S.Ct. 576, 44 L.Ed. 729 
(1900); Exxon Corp. v. Thompson, 564 So.2d 387 
(La.Ct.App. 1990). 
[13] We have held that the statutory prerequisite for a 
pooling order is the existence of a spacing order and 
that a spacing order defines the fractional interests in a 
drilling unit as of the date of the spacing order. I£ 
however, an operator of a well engages in inequitable 
conduct by wrongfully delaying an application for a 
spacing order, thereby prejudicing another's correlative 
right, the Board may make appropriate adjustments as 
to the date the pooling order is effective. That is, a 
pooling order may be made effective prior to the entry 
of a spacing order to offset any inequitable delay by the 
operator in pursuing a petition for a spacing order. 
Section 40-6- 6(5) specifically states that the Board 
may enter a pooling order "upon terms that are just and 
reasonable." Clearly, the statutory scheme 
contemplates prompt action in the prosecution of a 
petition for a spacing order. 
*229 [14] The Board's critical conclusions of law in 
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this case were as follows: 
24. Section 40-6-6(5) requires that the Board pool 
upon terms that are just and reasonable. This 
would mean that each owner in the pool is entitled 
to share in the benefits of production in proportion 
to their ownership of the pool. In the ordinary 
cases, this is accomplished by allowing each owner 
in a spacing unit to participate in production from 
the well from first production. The Board has the 
power and authority to make pooling effective as of 
first production. However, there may be 
circumstances in which such application of this rule 
would not be just and reasonable; and in such 
cases the Board has the power and authority to 
make the pooling effective as of another date. 
25. Upon completion of the UCOLO well No. 2 as 
a gas well, rule C-3-(b) of the Board's General 
Rules and Regulations which establishes statewide 
spacing in the absence of special field/pool spacing 
precludes the drilling for the production of an 
additional Desert Creek gas well in the N 1/2 of 
Section 10. Thus, the general rule which we stated 
which makes pooling effective as of first 
production should apply in the absence of special 
circumstances which would make pooling as of 
such date not just and reasonable. We find no such 
circumstances in this case, 
[15][16] The Board, in applying the rule formulated in 
Bennion v. Bd. of Oil, Gas & Mining, erred as a matter 
of law. Bennion dealt with a spacing order that was 
entered before the well was completed. The pooling 
order was properly made retroactive to first production 
because that was after entry of the spacing order. With 
respect to wildcat or exploratory wells, however, where 
no preexisting field-wide spacing order has been 
entered, the rule is that a pooling order should be 
effective no earlier than the date of a spacing order, 
unless there are special circumstances which would 
make it just and equitable for an order to be retroactive 
to protect correlative rights established by the Act from 
inequitable or overreaching conduct. Thus if the 
operator of a successful wildcat well wrongiully delays 
petitioning for a spacing order or wrongfully prolongs 
the hearing process, the Board may make a pooling 
order retroactive to the date of the application for a 
spacing order, or possibly to a prior time. 
Here, the Bairds cannot be charged with any kind of 
wrongful delay. Celsius was the appropriate party for 
filing a petition for a pooling order. The record 
indicates that Celsius was not dilatory; indeed, it 
appeared anxious for an early pooling order because it 
wanted to avoid the effects of a federal compensatory 
royalty. In fact, Celsius petitioned for a pooling order 
before it had developed sufficient evidence to sustain 
the order, causing it to subsequently withdraw its 
petition. Furthermore, the BLM was aware that Ucolo 
No. 2 had been completed in a known geologic 
formation, providing it with some basis for surmising 
that Ucolo No. 2 might drain gas from under the BLM 
tract. Under those circumstances, the BLM might have 
taken some action, but it did not. In all events, the 
Bairds did not engage in any inequitable conduct or do 
anything to delay entry of the spacing order. 
In sum, the Board erred as a matter of law in ruling 
that the general rule irr these circumstances is that a 
pooling order should be retroactive to the date of first 
production. Furthermore, there is no basis in this case 
for concluding that it would have been appropriate to 
invoke the "just and equitable" exception to the general 
rule and to hold that the pooling order, on the particular 
facts of this case, should have been made effective prior 
to the entry of the spacing order. 
We affirm the district court order. 
HALL, C.J., HOWE, Associate C.J., and DURHAM 
and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur. 
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